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DO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 
DETER OR EXACERBATE HUMANITARIAN 
ATROCITIES? 
JULIAN KU∗ 
JIDE NZELIBE∗∗ 
Contemporary justifications for international criminal tribunals 
(ICTs), especially the permanent International Criminal Court, 
often stress the role of such tribunals in deterring future 
humanitarian atrocities. But hardly any academic commentary has 
attempted to explore in depth this deterrence rationale. This essay 
utilizes economic models of deterrence to analyze whether a 
potential perpetrator of humanitarian atrocities would likely be 
deterred by the risk of future prosecution by an ICT. According to 
the economic theory of deterrence, two factors—certainty and 
severity of punishment—are central to the reduction of crime after 
taking into account a particular individual’s preference for risk. In 
the context of a possible ICT prosecution, isolating the pool of 
individuals likely to commit humanitarian atrocities is difficult but 
not insurmountable. Given that international tribunals are not likely 
to have independent police powers in the foreseeable future, the 
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actors most likely to face prosecution are individuals in weak states 
who have failed politically. In other words, the likely pool will be 
composed of individuals in weak states who have been forced from 
political power by local or foreign forces. Examining evidence 
concerning the fates of failed coup plotters and dictators in Africa—
a group that represents a pool of likely perpetrators of atrocities—
we show that the probability that this pool of individuals will be 
subject to a range of other legal and extra-legal sanctions is quite 
high. Moreover, the severity of the sanctions these individuals are 
likely to face—death, life imprisonment, and torture—is also likely 
to be higher than those imposed by an ICT. Thus, prosecution by an 
ICT will often serve as a weaker substitute, rather than a 
complement, to pre-existing sanctions. In one situation, however, 
the threat of ICT prosecution is likely to complement other possible 
sanctions and serve as a deterrent—where the perpetrator is 
unlikely to be subject to other sanctions because he is considered to 
be politically indispensable. But in such circumstances, the ex ante 
benefits of deterrence from ICT prosecution will likely be 
outweighed by the ex post harms of prosecuting a spoiler—an 
individual whose prosecution is likely to generate local political 
instability. In other words, the prospect of prosecution by an ICT 
may sometimes exacerbate the risks of humanitarian atrocities. 
Finally, prosecution by an ICT may also exacerbate conflicts 
through a political opportunism effect in which local politicians will 
have an incentive to free-ride off ICT efforts and turn a blind eye to 
the kinds of institutional reforms that are more likely to prevent 
future atrocities.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of humanitarian atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, 
Uganda, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Sudan, international criminal 
tribunals (ICTs), including the permanent International Criminal Court 
(ICC), have become a regular fixture of the international legal scene. 
Indeed, the establishment of the ICC in 2000 was considered a milestone 
by many international lawyers, with the New York Times calling it “the 
biggest change in international law in decades.”1 For the most part, 
contemporary justifications for these tribunals stress their potential to deter 
future humanitarian atrocities. The emerging consensus in human rights 
circles is that international criminal tribunals are necessary to address what 
former prosecutor Louise Arbour of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Yugoslavia (ICTY) has called “the entrenched culture of impunity” 
where “the enforcement of humanitarian law is the exception and not the 
rule.”2 More importantly, the member states that created these new 
tribunals have not minced words about what they expect these entities to 
achieve. For instance, the Security Council Resolution that established the 
ICTY boldly proclaims that the purpose of that tribunal is “to put an end to 
[international atrocities] and to take effective measures to bring to justice 
the persons who are responsible for them.”3 
But is such widespread optimism about the deterrence potential of ICTs 
warranted? For instance, is there any credible evidence that there is an 
 
 
 1. Barbara Crossette, U.S. Gains a Compromise on War Crimes Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 
2000, at A6. 
 2. Louise Arbour, The Prosecution of International Crimes: Prospects and Pitfalls, 1 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 13, 23 (1999). 
 3. S.C. Res. 827, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993), available at http://www.un.org/ 
Docs/scres/1993/scres93.htm (follow link for “Resolution 827”). 
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“underlying culture of impunity” in which perpetrators of genocidal 
violence routinely face little or no prospect of sanctions? More 
importantly, how do we know that the pool of individuals likely to commit 
such atrocities will be meaningfully deterred by the threat of an ICT 
prosecution? Finally, is it possible that ICT prosecutions could exacerbate 
the risk of humanitarian atrocities in weak or failing states by reducing the 
incentives of political spoilers to participate in peace processes?  
Despite the salience of these questions, hardly any academic 
commentary has explored in depth the merits of the deterrence justification 
for ICTs. More often, the deterrence claim is simply asserted or rejected 
without much empirical or theoretical analysis.4 As far as we know, this 
Article represents one of the first comprehensive efforts to address these 
questions by applying an economic model of deterrence to a set of 
empirical data reflecting likely targets of ICT prosecutions.5  
We argue that, for both legal and political reasons, ICT prosecutions 
will be directed almost exclusively at individuals engaged in civil conflict 
within weak or failing states. Focusing on the fates of failed coup plotters 
in Africa—a pool of individuals who are likely to commit humanitarian 
atrocities in weak or failed states—we show that there is a significant 
likelihood that these individuals would face sanctions that are both more 
certain and severe than any sanction that would be meted out by an ICT. 
Thus, in many circumstances, an ICT prosecution will serve as a weaker 
substitute, rather than a complement, to preexisting sanctions against 
likely ICT targets.  
Furthermore, contrary to the culture of impunity thesis, we suggest that 
offenders commit more atrocities in weak states because they have more 
opportunities to do so, and not because they have a greater inclination to 
commit such atrocities. Because of norms of political accountability and 
strong state institutions, potential offenders in more mature states face 
significant constraints on their ability to mobilize violent groups and 
engage in large-scale humanitarian atrocities. Thus, the higher frequency 
 
 
 4. Indeed, Mark Drumbl faults both the realist skeptics and optimists for the lack of empirical 
support for their respective positions on the deterrent value of ICTs. See Mark Drumbl, Collective 
Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 539, 548 
(2005) (“My sense, however, is that th[e] [realist] scholarship is driven more by ideology than by 
empiricism. In the end, it is as blindly un-nurturing as the celebration of international criminal justice 
institutions is blindly nurturing.”). 
 5. One notable recent exception is Michael J. Gilligan, Is Enforcement Necessary for 
Effectiveness? A Model of the International Criminal Regime, 60 INT’L ORG. 935 (2006) (using game 
theoretic model to suggest that international criminal tribunals might deter leaders from committing 
atrocities at the margin). However, Gilligan’s model is theoretical and avoids reaching any empirical 
conclusions. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss4/1
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of humanitarian atrocities in weak or failed states may be due to the lack 
of credible institutions and mechanisms within those states that can 
constrain likely perpetrators of such atrocities. In other words, dictators or 
rebels in weak states may commit more atrocities not because they do not 
have to fear any sanctions, but because they have more occasions to 
engage in such heinous acts. But the deterrence rationale for ICTs fails to 
distinguish fundamentally between those “push” factors that motivate 
individuals to commit atrocities from those “pull” factors that make such 
atrocities possible.  
In fact, in certain circumstances, we argue, ICTs might actually 
exacerbate humanitarian atrocities by prosecuting individuals whose 
political cooperation is critical to successful peace negotiations in weak or 
failed states. In such states, political bargains among the elites—including 
belligerents and spoilers—are often necessary for democratic 
consolidation and political stability. But since ICT prosecutions are likely 
to target those individuals whose cooperation is often necessary for 
political stability, the prosecutions are likely to undermine such bargains 
or make such bargains unlikely in the first place. Moreover, greater 
enforcement by an ICT may cause more instability through a perverse 
political opportunism effect. In other words, since politicians in weak 
states have an incentive to use ICT prosecutions to accomplish domestic 
political goals that have little to do with promoting international justice, 
the formation of an ICT may encourage such politicians to under-invest in 
domestic institutions or mechanisms that will constrain future genocidal 
violence.  
We wish to add one important caveat to our analysis. This Article does 
not claim that deterrence is the only plausible justification for ICTs. 
Indeed, proponents of ICTs have pointed to other worthwhile systemic 
goals such as the reinforcement of rule of law norms and the need to 
“honor and redeem the suffering of the individual victim(s).”6 We do not 
take any position here as to whether ICTs can successfully accomplish 
these other goals. Even recognizing these other possible rationales for 
ICTs, however, many judges and commentators have argued that 
deterrence should be the primary objective of a criminal enforcement 
 
 
 6. Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a 
Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2544 n.22 (1991) (quotations omitted); see also Diane Marie 
Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, 2:2 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 93, 118–20 (2002) 
(focusing on expressivist rationale for ICTs); Allison Marston Danner, Enhancing the Legitimacy and 
Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 510, 
543 (2003) (observing that ICTs combine a retributive and deterrent approach).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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system.7 Moreover, many prominent international legal academics, as well 
as the ICTs themselves, have emphatically proclaimed deterrence as a 
significant justification for the creation of ICTs.8  
We also do not engage the burgeoning literature criticizing the efficacy 
of the ICC because it has not gained the cooperation of powerful countries 
like the United States.9 While acknowledging that power politics will 
sometimes play a critical role in the efficacy of international institutions,10 
 
 
 7. See 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 517, 520–21 (Robert Campbell ed., 
Thoemmes Continuum 4th ed. 2002) (1879); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 219 
(6th ed. 2003); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 2.1, at 
103 (2d ed. 1986). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has also declared deterrence and 
retribution to be the key objectives of criminal punishment. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 
361–62 (1997); Dep’t of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 794 (1994) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(“Our double jeopardy cases make clear that a civil sanction will be considered punishment to the 
extent that it serves only the purposes of retribution and deterrence, as opposed to furthering any 
nonpunitive objective.”); see also Warren v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 659 F.2d 183, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(observing that “the core purpose of the criminal law” is “to regulate behavior by threatening 
unpleasant consequences should an individual commit a harmful act”). 
 8. See Overview of the Rome Statute of the International Court (1998–1999), http://www. 
un.org/law/icc/general/overview.htm (describing “effective deterrence [as] a primary objective of 
those working to establish the international criminal court”) (last visited Nov. 30, 2006); see also 
MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES 
TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG 218–19 (1997) (emphasizing deterrence role of ICTs); M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
Combating Impunity for International Crimes, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 409, 410 (2000) (“The pursuit of 
justice and accountability, it is believed, fulfills fundamental human values, helps achieve peace and 
reconciliation, and contributes to the prevention and deterrence of future conflicts.”). Richard 
Goldstone, the former Chief Prosecutor at the ICTY, has also stressed the potential deterrence effect of 
ICTs: 
If people in leadership positions know there’s an international court out there, that there’s an 
international prosecutor, and that the international community is going to act as an 
international police force, I just cannot believe that they aren’t going to think twice as to the 
consequences. Until now, they haven’t had to. There’s been no enforcement mechanism at all. 
Michael P. Scharf, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, An Appraisal of the First International War Crimes 
Tribunal since Nuremberg, 60 ALB. L. REV. 861, 868 (1997) (quoting Goldstone). 
 9. See Diane Marie Amann & M.N.S. Sellers, The United States and the International Criminal 
Court, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 381 (2002); John R. Bolton, The Risks and Weaknesses of the International 
Criminal Court from America’s Perspective, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 (2001); Jack 
Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 93 (2003); 
Michael Smidt, The International Criminal Court: An Effective Means of Deterrence?, 167 MIL. L. 
REV. 156 (2001); Ruth Wedgwood, Fiddling in Rome, 77 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 20 (1998). Jenia 
Iontcheva Turner has also argued that the lack of support for the ICC from key players such as the 
United States suggests that a less centralized approach to criminal enforcement might be appropriate. 
See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2005). 
Posner and Yoo have argued that the United States withdrawal from the ICC reflects the unwillingness 
of the United States to be subject to an entity it could not control. See Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, 
Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 67–70 (2005). For a 
comprehensive discussion of the United States approach to the ICC negotiations during the Clinton 
Administration, see David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Court, 35 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 47 (2002). 
 10. For a perspective that argues that the United States resistance to the Treaty of Rome does not 
reflect deep moral or analytical concerns but it mostly motivated by politics, see Mariano-Florentino 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss4/1
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our critique of the role of international criminal tribunals is much broader 
and more fundamental. We contend that even when there is support for 
ICTs by powerful countries like the United States, it is still very likely that 
ICTs will play a marginal, if not counterproductive, role in deterring 
humanitarian atrocities in the weak or failing states where such atrocities 
are most likely to be committed. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Part II briefly summarizes the main 
theoretical and empirical assumptions about the capacity of ICTs to deter 
humanitarian atrocities. We argue that most of these assumptions are 
dubious, or at a minimum, highly debatable, especially because these 
assumptions rarely take into account the fact that ICT prosecutions are 
usually limited to weak or failed states. Part III develops a framework 
based on the economic model of deterrence to examine the probable 
deterrent effects of an ICT. Part IV then applies that deterrence model to 
data on the fates of failed coup plotters in Africa—a pool of individuals 
likely to be subject to prosecution by an ICT. Contrary to the conventional 
wisdom, this data suggests that the coup plotters in Africa are not likely to 
be deterred from committing humanitarian atrocities by the prospect of 
prosecution by ICTs. Indeed, these individuals are already subject to the 
risk of a range of sanctions that are usually both much more severe and 
certain than any sanction that could be meted out by an ICT. Part V 
sketches briefly an alternative explanation for recurring humanitarian 
atrocities in weak or failed states that has been overlooked by proponents 
of ICTs: the opportunity rather than the willingness or motive to commit 
such atrocities. Part VI explores some of the perverse consequences of 
prosecution by ICTs, many of which are rooted in the fallible institutional 
structures and insecurities of regimes in weak or failed states.  
II. DECONSTRUCTING THE DETERRENCE ARGUMENTS FOR ICTS 
The last two decades have witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of 
international criminal tribunals empowered to punish individuals for 
violations of international crimes. One of the primary justifications for 
ICT prosecutions of individuals who commit humanitarian atrocities is 
that such prosecutions will promote reconciliation and deter future actors 
from committing such atrocities.11 The importance of this rationale to the 
 
 
Cuéllar, The International Criminal Court and the Political Economy of Antitreaty Discourse, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 1597 (2003). 
 11. See, e.g., David J. Scheffer, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 11 PACE INT’L L. 
REV. 319, 328 (1999) (“As instruments of deterrence, the tribunals are formidable partners that cannot 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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pro-ICT movement is highlighted by wide academic support for 
permanent as opposed to ad hoc international criminal tribunals. Unlike ad 
hoc ICTs, supporters of ICTs have argued that a permanent International 
Criminal Court will be more likely to deter future humanitarian atrocities. 
A. The Rise of International Criminal Tribunals 
The idea of establishing international criminal tribunals to punish war 
crimes and humanitarian atrocities dates back to at least the end of World 
War I, when the victorious Allies agreed to hold international war crimes 
trials for Germany’s defeated emperor Wilhelm II as well as other alleged 
German war criminals.12 Although this plan was eventually thwarted by 
Holland’s refusal to surrender the exiled Kaiser and by Germany’s post-
war resistance, the idea that serious international atrocities require an 
international as opposed to a domestic criminal process was first 
established during this period.13 
At the end of World War II, the victorious Allies resolved to improve 
upon their earlier efforts by establishing international trials for German 
and Japanese war criminals. The most famous of these international trials 
was held in Nuremberg, Germany. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert 
Jackson served as one of the chief prosecutors, and the judges hailed from 
the Allied victors. For many international law scholars, the Nuremberg 
trials established crucial precedents for the recognition and enforcement of 
international law norms against serious war crimes and atrocities like 
genocide by international, rather than domestic, tribunals.14  
The success of Nuremberg loomed large during the Balkan wars of the 
1990s when Europe faced its first major armed conflict since the end of 
World War II. Drawing on the Nuremberg example and responding to 
pressure from international human rights organizations, the United Nations 
Security Council agreed in 1993 to create that organization’s first 
 
 
be lightly ignored in the future.”). 
 12. See Treaty of Peace with Germany art. 227, June 28, 1919 (Treaty of Versailles), available at 
http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/text/versaillestreaty/vercontents.html (agreeing to publicly “arraign 
[Kaiser] for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties” before 
international court with judges from America, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan); see also id. art. 228 
(requiring surrender of any other Germans who had “committed acts in violation of the laws and 
customs of war”). For a general discussion of these trials, see GARY A. BASS, STAYING THE HAND OF 
VENGEANCE 75–105 (2000). 
 13.  See BASS, supra note 12, at 104–05. 
 14.  See, e.g., Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice: Postwar Legacies, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1615, 
1615 (2006) (“Nuremberg established the principle of individual criminal accountability for human 
rights violations perpetrated against civilians in wartime: that certain crimes are so heinous that they 
violate the ‘law of nations’ and may be prosecuted anywhere.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss4/1
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international tribunal empowered to punish individuals for war crimes and 
humanitarian atrocities.15 The establishment of this tribunal, known as the 
ICTY, was followed in 1996 by the establishment of a second 
international criminal tribunal to punish perpetrators of atrocities during 
the 1994 Rwandan civil war. Similar tribunals were also set up to punish 
atrocities in Sierra Leone and Cambodia.16  
All of these tribunals are ad hoc tribunals with limited jurisdiction, 
usually confined to atrocities arising out of a particular conflict, and whose 
mandates will eventually expire.17 In 2002, however, a number of 
countries agreed to establish a permanent International Criminal Court 
(ICC) with broad jurisdiction over atrocities occurring in the territory of 
any state party to the ICC treaty.18 Nearly one hundred countries have 
signed and ratified the ICC statute.19  
Despite their differences, all international criminal tribunals share some 
important characteristics. Importantly, all of the ICTs are avowedly 
international rather than national institutions. Created by international 
agreement or the action of an international institution like the U.N. 
Security Council, the ICTs are purposely staffed by nationals who take an 
oath of “independence” and who are not responsible to their home 
countries.20  
For both legal and political reasons, any ICT prosecutions in the 
foreseeable future will be targeted almost exclusively at offenders in weak 
or failed states.21 All existing ad hoc ICTs, for instance, require U.N. 
 
 
 15. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/ 
scres/1993/scres93.htm (follow link for “Resolution 808”). For a detailed overview of the 
establishment and operation of the ICTY, including the personal dynamics of the prosecutors who 
staffed the court, see JOHN HAGAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS: PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES IN THE 
HAGUE TRIBUNAL (2003).  
 16. Both the Sierra Leone and Cambodia tribunals are different in that they are “hybrid” tribunals 
mixing local, national judges with international ones. The ICTY and ICTR are purely international 
tribunals without any judges or prosecutors from the countries involved in the conflicts. For a defense 
of these hybrid tribunals, see Turner, supra note 9.  
 17. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1503, para. 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003), available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions03.html (follow link for “Security Council resolution 
1503”) (calling “on the ICTY and the ICTR to take all possible measures to complete investigations by 
the end of 2004, to complete all trial activities at first instance by the end of 2008, and to complete all 
work in 2010” and amending authorizing statutes to do so). 
 18. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 19. See International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, http://www.icc-cpi.int/asp/ 
statesparties.html (for list of states parties to Rome Statute).  
 20. Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 40.  
 21. Weak and failed states are generally defined as states that cannot deliver basic political 
“goods” like security, education, health services, or economic opportunity. See Robert I. Rotberg, The 
New Nature of Nation-State Failure, 25 WASH. Q., Summer 2002, at 85–87. 
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Security Council resolutions to authorize prosecution of crimes and all 
have been targeted toward weak or failed states like Rwanda or 
Yugoslavia. Understandably, there have been no serious proposals for 
establishing ad hoc ICTs to investigate or prosecute potential offenses by 
strong veto-wielding states like Russia or the United States because of the 
necessity of a Security Council resolution. Similarly, the legal mandate of 
the ICC is limited to “the most serious crimes of international concern” 
including genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of 
aggression—offenses that are more likely to occur in weak or 
dysfunctional states.22 Moreover, the ICC’s jurisdiction extends only to the 
territories or nationals of states that have acceded to the Rome Statute.23 
Finally, the ICC can only exercise jurisdiction if a state party is “unwilling 
or unable” to genuinely carry out an investigation or prosecution of a 
potential offense.24  
The combined effect of these legal limitations is that mature states, 
especially those with powerful militaries which might otherwise be 
exposed to ICC prosecution, can avoid the reach of the ICC simply by 
refusing to join the ICC Statute. Indeed, some of the most militarily 
powerful and populous countries in the world (China, Russia, Turkey, 
Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Israel, and the United States) have either 
refused to sign or refused to ratify the ICC Statute.25 The United States has 
gone farther and signed a number of “Article 98” agreements requiring 
states that are party to the ICC to grant immunity to U.S. troops operating 
in those states.26 Even powerful states that have joined the ICC, like 
Australia, the United Kingdom, and France, are somewhat protected from 
 
 
 22. Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 5. 
 23. Id. art. 13. 
 24. Id. art. 17(1) (directing ICC to refuse to admit cases where “[t]he case is being investigated 
or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable 
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution” or where “[t]he case has been investigated by a 
State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, 
unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute”).  
 25. See International Criminal Court, supra note 19. See also CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
WORLD FACTBOOK, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html (last visited Nov. 30, 
2006) (the United States, China, India, Turkey, and Israel all rank in the top twenty military powers, 
ranked by military expenditures). As Goldsmith argues, strong states like the United States that have 
large overseas military commitments are highly unlikely to join the ICC unless that institution is 
subject to political control through the Security Council. Goldsmith, supra note 9. 
 26. The United States appears to have signed nearly 100 such agreements. See Richard Boucher, 
Spokesman, U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Signs 100th Article 98 Agreement (May 3, 2005), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/45573.htm (announcing signing of 100th agreement); see 
generally Rachel Harkavy, Picking Our Battles: A Strategy for the United States in the Wake of 
Mexico’s Becoming a State Party to the International Criminal Court, 40 GA. L. REV. 915, 919 n.10 
(2006). 
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ICC prosecutions because those states are likely to satisfy the ICC’s 
international due process standards for investigating and prosecuting 
potential offenders on a domestic level.27  
B. International Criminal Justice and Deterrence 
Despite these limitations, the creation of the ICC and the continued 
work of the ad hoc tribunals represent a huge victory for supporters of a 
system of international criminal justice. Legal academics have been some 
of the most vocal and prominent advocates for creating and supporting 
ICTs. Most of the academic literature has eschewed normative 
justifications for ICTs and focused on improving the institutional design of 
ICTs to ensure their effectiveness.28 To the extent academic supporters 
have bothered to offer justifications for the creation and support of ICTs in 
general, and the ICC in particular, they almost always claim that ICTs can 
deter or prevent future humanitarian atrocities.29  
The deterrence rationale for ICTs usually takes the form of a 
generalized argument in favor of justice for perpetrators of humanitarian 
atrocities and in opposition to impunity and realpolitik. This rationale 
assumes not only that ICTs provide retribution for victims of war crimes 
and atrocities by punishing perpetrators, but that the very pursuit of justice 
can also prevent future atrocities. As one of the leading advocates for ICTs 
explains, “[t]he pursuit of justice and accountability fulfills fundamental 
human needs and expresses key values necessary for the prevention and 
deterrence of future conflicts.”30 The millions of victims of humanitarian 
atrocities provide “grim testament to the failure of the international 
community to . . . prevent aggression and enforce international 
 
 
 27. Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 17(2) (directing ICC to consider “principles of due process 
recognized by international law” when determining whether state is unable or unwilling to prosecute). 
Consensus on exactly how to apply these principles was missing at the original conference establishing 
the court. See John T. Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 41 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999). 
 28. See Allison Marston Danner, Navigating Law and Politics: The Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court and the Independent Counsel, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1633 (2003); Mark 
Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1751 
(2005). 
 29. Some academics have recognized the problems with assuming an ICT can deter atrocities, 
although most do so only in the context of proposals to increase the use and powers of ICTs so as to 
increase the likelihood of deterrence. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, Assessing International Criminal 
Adjudication of Human Rights Atrocities, THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES 169, 174 (2000–2003); 
Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution 
of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 573 (2002). 
 30. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Justice and Peace: The Importance of Choosing Accountability over 
Realpolitik, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 191, 192 (2003).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 777 Ku Nzelibe book pages.doc 8/31/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
788 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:777 
 
 
 
 
humanitarian law.”31 Indeed, former ICTY judge Antonio Cassese 
suggests that the failed efforts to punish the perpetrators of the Armenian 
genocide “gave a nod and a wink to Adolf Hitler and others to pursue the 
Holocaust some twenty years later.”32 
This broad notion that justice will deter future atrocities (or that failing 
to provide justice will encourage future ones) is reflected in the preamble 
to the statute creating the International Criminal Court. That statute, which 
has been signed and ratified by nearly 171 countries, declares that the ICC 
is “[d]etermined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators . . . and thus 
to contribute to the prevention of [serious international] crimes.”33  
Elaborations of the relationship between ICT justice and deterrence 
take two forms. First, some advocates have suggested that ICTs are 
uniquely positioned to prevent atrocities in the long term by fostering 
conditions for the emergence of a political culture where such atrocities 
are no longer acceptable. As Payam Akhavan, a former legal advisor to the 
ICTY has explained, ICT prosecutions can establish “unconscious 
inhibitions against crime” or a “condition of habitual lawfulness”34 in a 
society where such atrocities were previously accepted.  
Second, and more commonly, ICT supporters have argued that ICTs 
will have immediate deterrence effects as long as they are designed 
properly and provided adequate authority and resources. Deterrence of 
atrocities will occur when ICTs can achieve the same frequency and 
consistency in the prosecution of international crimes as domestic legal 
systems achieve in the prosecution of domestic crimes. Deterrence thus 
requires further support for ICTs and superior institutional design. 
Professor Meron’s formulation is indicative of this view: “Instead of 
despairing over the prospects of deterrence, the international community 
should enhance the probability of punishment by encouraging 
prosecutions before the national courts, especially of third states, by 
making ad hoc Tribunals effective, and by establishing a vigorous, 
standing international criminal court.”35 
 
 
 31. Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy 
Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 384 (2000).  
 32. See Antonio Cassese, Reflections on International Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L. REV. 1 
(1998). 
 33. Rome Statute, supra note 18, Preamble (emphasis added). 
 34. Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future 
Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7, 16 (2001) (quoting Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventative 
Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 951 (1966)). 
 35. Theodor Meron, From Nuremberg to the Hague, 149 MIL. L. REV. 107, 110–11 (1995).  
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Indeed, a 2005 diplomatic dispute over the U.N. Security Council’s 
referral of Sudan to the new International Criminal Court demonstrates the 
central importance of deterrence to supporters of ICTs. The United States 
initially opposed a referral of Sudan to the ICC, and advocated instead for 
the creation of an ad hoc tribunal on the model of the ICTR—the tribunal 
used in Rwanda.36 Thus, at least publicly, the United States favored an 
international criminal prosecution of atrocities committed in Sudan. The 
only dispute was over which type of ICT to use: ad hoc or permanent.37  
Despite the United States’ support for active prosecution of Sudanese 
war criminals, leading non-governmental organizations and ICT advocates 
sharply criticized the United States’ opposition to an ICC referral. While 
conceding that ad hoc ICTs could prosecute and punish perpetrators in 
Sudan, they argued that such ad hoc ICTs could not deter future 
atrocities.38 Unlike a permanent ICC, the ad hoc ICTs are only created 
after a particular set of atrocities occurs and with a necessarily limited 
jurisdiction. A permanent ICC prosecution would not only punish 
individuals in Sudan, but also deter future atrocities in places other than 
Sudan.39 The Sudan ICC referral flap highlights the importance of 
deterrence to ICT supporters. If the ICTs were justified on purely 
retributive grounds irrespective of deterrence effects, then the pre-ICC 
system of selective ad hoc ICTs would be equally attractive as the ICC. It 
is deterrence, however, that gives the ICC its distinctive rationale.  
All versions of the ICT deterrence rationale rely on some version of the 
“culture of impunity” thesis. This is the assumption that ICTs can deter 
future atrocities by ending a culture where offenders escape sanctions for 
committing humanitarian atrocities. By subjecting such offenders to the 
credible threat of an ad hoc ICT or ICC prosecution, such a culture of 
impunity would slowly be undermined. Realizing that an ICT prosecution 
is possible, offenders would be more likely to refrain from committing 
 
 
 36. See Warren Hoge, U.S. Lobbies U.N. on Darfur and International Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
29, 2005, at A8. 
 37. For a description of the U.S. government’s official position, see Richard Boucher, 
Spokesman, U.S. Dep’t of State, Daily Press Briefing (Feb. 1, 2005), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ 
dpb/2005/41453.htm. The United States eventually relented and abstained from a vote referring Sudan 
to the ICC. 
 38. See, e.g., Nicholas Kristof, Why Should We Shield the Killers?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2005, at 
A21 (quoting Kenneth Roth, spokesman for Human Rights Watch, who stated “[t]he I.C.C. could start 
tomorrow saving lives . . . [but w]ith the [ad hoc] tribunal route, you’re talking about another year of 
killing”). 
 39. See id.; see also Samantha Power, Court of First Resort, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2005, at A23 
(arguing that permanent court is more effective than ad hoc court).  
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atrocities.40 As Elizabeth Kiss puts it, “just as wounds fester when they are 
not exposed to the open air, so unacknowledged injustice can poison 
societies and produce the cycles of distrust, hatred, and violence that we 
have witnessed in many parts of the world.”41  
C. Evaluating the Deterrence Effect of ICTs 
Although deterrence of future humanitarian atrocities is plainly an 
important justification for establishing ICTs, the problem of deterrence has 
been addressed almost exclusively in the context of scholarship analyzing 
the institutional design and effectiveness of ICTs.42 Most of the 
scholarship tends to analyze, often from a very normative point of view, 
whether ICTs are effective in bringing justice to war-torn communities 
and deterring future perpetrators of atrocities, given certain institutional 
design features.43 For instance, Professor David Wippman argues that 
specific institutional limitations of the ICC, such as the requirement of a 
Security Council referral if a state does not assent to jurisdiction, make it 
unlikely that the ICC will be able to prosecute the perpetrators of atrocities 
in many internal conflicts.44 But there is almost no scholarship attempting 
to analyze whether, as an empirical matter, ICTs are likely to have, or 
actually have had, any deterrence effect on perpetrators of humanitarian 
atrocities.45  
 
 
 40. Some evidence for this thesis is offered by anecdotes, such as this one from leading ICT 
advocate Samantha Power: 
Skeptics say that international courts will never deter determined warlords. Musa Hilal, the 
coordinator of the deadly Janjaweed militia in Darfur, gave me a very different impression 
when I met with him soon after the Bush administration had named him as a potential 
suspect. He had left Darfur and was living in Khartoum, courting journalists in the hopes of 
improving his reputation. Almost as soon as I sat down with him, he began his defense. Like 
his victims, he had only one place on his mind. “I do not belong at the Hague,” he said. 
Power, supra note 39. 
 41. Elizabeth Kiss, Moral Ambition Within and Beyond Political Constraints: Reflections on 
Retroactive Justice, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 68, 71–72 (Robert 
I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000). 
 42. See, e.g., Sadat & Carden, supra note 31, at 384. 
 43. See Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadic Judgment, 96 MICH. L. REV. 
2031, 2079–80 (1998) (doubting the effectiveness of deterrence in context of mass violence); Mark A. 
Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1221, 1254–55 (2000) (doubting the deterrence value of the ICTY and the ICTR for crimes against 
humanity). 
 44. See Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 13 (authorizing jurisdiction of ICC only in cases 
referred by a member of the ICC or by a referral from the U.N. Security Council). 
 45. The only exceptions to this dearth of scholarship are found in the international relations 
literature. See Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the 
Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 573 (2002); Jack Snyder & Leslie 
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One possible reason for the dearth of empirical studies on the 
deterrence effect of ICTs is that such studies are not possible. For instance, 
some commentators have argued that debates about deterrence in the ICT 
context are misplaced because there is no way to prove empirically that 
any particular ICT prosecution deters crime.46 While these commentators 
are correct to suggest that proof of a perpetrator’s state of mind will often 
prove difficult if not impossible to measure, it is not clear that such proof 
is at all necessary to measure the likelihood of deterrence.  
An alternative approach would be to measure the correlation between 
the prosecution of certain crimes and the change in the levels of such 
crimes, an approach that is commonly used in empirical assessments of the 
prosecution of domestic crimes.47 Furthermore, one can employ a risk 
assessment approach to measure the empirical probability that a 
perpetrator will be deterred by a particular sanction, given the existence of 
preexisting informal or formal sanctions, as we do in this paper. This 
approach tries to assess the current risks associated with the commission 
of certain crimes and asks whether future deterrence measures alter those 
risks.  
Given the importance of the deterrence rationale for supporters of 
ICTs, the lack of any empirical inquiry into this rationale in existing ICT 
scholarship is deeply unsatisfying. To the extent that ICTs continue to play 
a key role in international relations, the empirical question can no longer 
remain unaddressed. In the next two sections, we offer a model for 
measuring the deterrence effects of ICTs and an empirical study designed 
to test this model.  
 
 
Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice, 28 
INT’L SEC. 5 (Winter 2003–2004); see also Miklos Biro et al., Attitudes Toward Justice and Social 
Reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND 
COMMUNITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY, 183, 192–95 (Eric Stover & Harvey M. 
Weinstein eds., 2004) (reporting on surveys of post-war Balkan populations about ICTs). 
 46. David Scheffer, Should the United States Join the International Criminal Court, 9 U.C. 
DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 45, 51 (2002). Scheffer states: 
[W]hen you have a permanent international court standing, I think there will be a possible 
deterrence effect. For people to say there will be no deterrence at all is as factually 
unprovable as to say there will be deterrence. You can’t prove that. How do you prove that? 
How do you prove the state of mind of a perpetrator of these crimes . . . ? 
Id.; see also LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENIUM 51 (2002) 
(“Certainly, it is hoped, although not empirically demonstrable, that erecting a system of international 
criminal justice . . . will prevent the reoccurrence of abuses and assist in repairing the havoc wreaked 
upon society thereby.”). 
 47. See Samuel Cameron, The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A Survey of Theory and 
Evidence, 41 KYKLOS 301 (1988); Steven D. Levitt, Why Do Increased Arrest Rates Appear to Reduce 
Crime: Deterrence, Incapacitation, or Measurement Error? 36 ECON. INQUIRY 353 (1998).  
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III. ECONOMIC MODELS OF CRIME: THE LOGIC OF DETERRENCE 
A theory for how deterrence prevents crime is developed most 
thoroughly in economics literature. According to that literature, the two 
key elements contributing to the reduction of crime are the certainty and 
the severity of punishment.48 In a public enforcement model, certainty 
captures the overall likelihood that a criminal will be punished for his 
misdeeds; it is an element that combines the probability of arrest with the 
probability that the criminal will be convicted after arrest. Severity of 
punishment refers to the consequences of increasing the punitive quality of 
the punishment, such as extending the length of a prison term or 
substituting the death penalty for imprisonment. Overall, the theoretical 
model suggests that whether or not a criminal will commit an act depends 
on his view of the possibility of a sanction; he will only commit a crime 
when the expected benefits exceed the expected sanction.  
The relative weight of severity versus that of certainty in deterring 
crime has been the source of much debate in the economics literature of 
crime.49 For the purposes of this paper, we need not engage that debate; it 
suffices that both severity and certainty play a role in deterring crime. 
Moreover, as Tullock has observed, this question may not necessarily be 
relevant:  
Suppose a potential criminal has a choice between two punishment 
systems: One gives each person who commits burglary a one-in-100 
chance of serving one year in prison; in the other there is a one-in-
1,000 chance of serving ten years. It is not obvious to me that 
burglars would be very differently affected by these two punishment 
systems.50 
In any event, the formal thrust of much of the literature is to determine 
whether the sanction is set at a high enough level to optimize deterrence 
after balancing the social costs of the activity against the costs of 
enforcement. 
The theoretical logic that underpins the economic model of deterrence 
is both compelling and seductive. However, it is subject to two key 
 
 
 48. See generally Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. 
ECON. 169 (1968).  
 49. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 48, at 172; S. Decker & C.W. Kohfield, Certainty, Severity, and 
the Probability of Crime: A Logistic Analysis, 19 POL’Y STUD. J. 2 (1990); Sylvia Mendes & M.D. 
McDonald, Putting Severity Back in the Deterrence Package, 29 POL’Y STUD. J. 588 (2001).  
 50. Gordon Tullock, Does Punishment Deter Crime, 36 PUB. INT. 103, 107 (1974) (citations 
omitted). 
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qualifications. First, the model must account for an individual criminal’s 
preference for risk.51 All else being equal, the stronger the preference for 
risk, the more severe the sanction has to be for it to be effective. Under 
certain circumstances, individual preferences for certain benefits of crime 
can be so strong that the risk of sanctions has little or no deterrent effect. 
For instance, Margalioth and Blumkin use the example of the suicide 
terrorist to illustrate one group for whom sanctions will have no deterrence 
effect.52 They argue that since the suicide terrorist is willing to make the 
ultimate sacrifice in carrying out his criminal enterprise, only 
incapacitation can serve the goal of minimizing suicide terrorist threats.53 
Second, the general deterrence model must account for the availability 
of extra-legal or informal sanctions. These often refer to informal self-help 
sanctions such as shame, victim retaliation, or other vigilante actions.54 
For instance, in their study of drug robberies, Jacobs et al. show that those 
who rob drug dealers face significant risks of grave informal sanctions; 
since the drug dealers cannot report the crime to the authorities, they have 
strong incentives to retaliate.55 If both informal and formal sanctions exist 
for a particular offense or legal violation, however, there is a risk that the 
deterrent effect of the formal sanction will be discounted by a rational 
offender.56 In other words, any criminal justice system that imposes a 
weaker sanction than preexisting formal or informal alternatives is less 
likely to produce a credible deterrent bite.  
According to this view, a preexisting informal or formal sanction may 
serve as a substitute for other formal sanctions because it may also exhibit 
 
 
 51. As Becker observed in his original deterrence model, the deterrence force of sanctions 
depends on the individual’s attitude towards risk. See Becker, supra note 48, at 178–79. 
 52. See Yoram Margalioth & Tomer Blumkin, Targeting the Majority: Redesigning Racial 
Profiling, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 317. 
 53. For a discussion of such informal threats, see Bruce Jacobs et al., Managing Retaliation: 
Drug Robbery and Informal Sanction Threats, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 171 (2000).  
 54. See id. at 172–74.  
 55. See id. at 189. 
 56. Sometimes, the combined range of informal and formal sanctions for a particular crime may 
be too high and thus result in over-deterrence. For some discussion of this phenomenon, see Richard 
A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1745 (2005). Indeed, some 
scholars have suggested that in a case where the legal sanction provides the optimal level of deterrence 
for the relevant offense, then any resulting nonlegal sanctions should be deducted from the legal 
sanctions. See Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Should Courts Deduct Nonlegal Sanctions from Damages, 
30 J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (2001). But where the underlying crime produces no countervailing social 
benefit, such as genocide, mass rape, or murder, there is no real concern of over-deterrence. In such 
situations, there is no amount of the targeted crime that would be socially desirable. 
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similar,57 if not more significant, deterrence effects.58 Indeed, certain 
scholars have argued that private deterrence efforts might actually 
represent a more efficient alternative to public enforcement for fighting 
certain kinds of criminal offenses, such as cybercrimes.59 In any event, a 
simple example illustrates how informal sanctions can substitute for public 
enforcement efforts. Suppose a criminal has a 40% chance of getting 
arrested when he commits a burglary and then a 50% chance of getting 
convicted after getting arrested. Furthermore, suppose that if convicted 
this same criminal will definitely serve a one-year sentence. Accordingly, 
this criminal’s expected formal sanction for committing burglary will be 
equal to a 20% chance of serving a one-year sentence—or less than three 
months. But if we also suppose that the same burglar also faces a 50% 
chance of being subject to self-help retaliation by victims, this informal 
sanction by the victims may simply overwhelm or displace the effect of 
the formal sanction. In other words, the informal sanction may serve as a 
stronger substitute for the formal sanction because it is likely to be both 
more certain and severe. Thus, if we observe an individual committing a 
burglary in this scenario, we may safely assume that the individual is not 
likely to be easily deterred given the plausible range of the probabilities 
and severities of sanctions.  
Of course, our analysis does not suggest that a risk-loving individual 
will be completely insensitive to the prospect of cumulative criminal 
sanctions. Indeed, it is safe to assume that additional sanctions might have 
some effect on a rational offender’s calculus. But if the additional 
sanctions are likely to be both less severe and less certain than preexisting 
sanctions, then any further deterrent effect is likely to be marginal. Take, 
for instance, the ongoing debates in the law and economics literature about 
whether the death penalty actually deters homicides.60 Certain 
commentators have argued that if the prospect of being subject to the death 
 
 
 57. In economic parlance, substitutes refer to goods that compete with each other, while 
complements refer to goods that go together. See WALTER NICHOLSON, INTERMEDIATE 
MICROECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATION 98 (4th ed. 1987).  
 58. See POSNER, supra note 7, § 22.1 (suggesting that public and private forms of crime 
prevention efforts could be substitutes); see also Bruce Benson & Brent Mast, Privately Produced 
General Deterrence, 44 J.L. & ECON. 725, 727 (2001); Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and 
Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315, 343 (1984) (“[P] 
ublic enforcement and private prevention are alternative means of reducing crime and . . . there is an 
inverse relationship between them.”). 
 59. See, e.g., Neal K. Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1077–80 
(2001).  
 60. For a survey of the literature, see John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of 
Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2005).  
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penalty is significantly low and if the punishment itself does not affect the 
life expectancy of death row inmates, then it might not have much of a 
deterrent effect.61  
For instance, Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich show that as of 1997, only 
2% of those on death row were actually executed, and even for this small 
group there was a significant time-lag between sentencing and execution.62 
Comparing the relative frequency of prison death rates to the fates of those 
on death row, they surmise that prison conditions are likely to have a 
greater deterrent effect than capital punishment.63 More importantly, given 
the empirically low probability of ever being subject to the death penalty, 
they conclude that is unlikely that the “the fear of execution would be a 
driving force in a rational criminal’s calculus.”64 In other words, they 
suggest that the cumulative effect of capital punishment is likely to 
exercise only a marginal deterrent effect on a pool of offenders who 
already face a significantly higher risk of dying because of prison 
conditions. To be sure, by using this example we do not intend to endorse 
any empirical result in the ongoing debates about the deterrent effects of 
the death penalty. What is important is that examining the scope of 
preexisting sanctions provides a promising methodological approach for 
understanding the deterrent effect of additional sanctions in general.  
One might argue that even if formal sanctions serve as imperfect 
substitutes for informal sanctions, a society may still prefer to maintain 
formal sanctions for expressive reasons. Regardless of the individual 
deterrence effects of the formal sanction, we may still want to criminalize 
certain activities in order to communicate to possible future offenders that 
the society devalues such actions.65 In this picture, the expressive function 
of criminalizing the action may have a secondary deterrence value as a 
form of public norm that discloses what a society is unwilling to tolerate 
as acceptable social behavior. Some commentators have suggested that the 
 
 
 61. See Lawrence Katz et al., Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and Deterrence, 5 AM. L. 
& ECON. REV. 318 (2003).  
 62. See id. at 319–20. 
 63. See id. at 320. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Stephanos Bibas & Richard Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal 
Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 123 (2004) (“Offenders, victims, and society interpret the failure to 
punish to mean that the crime is not really wrong and that the offender is free to keep doing it.”); 
Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1407–35 (2005) (demonstrating that perceived 
legitimacy and enforcement of certain laws can affect how individuals perceive the legitimacy of other 
aspects of the legal system); see Dan M. Kahan, What do Alternative Sanctions Mean, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 591, 593 (1996) (observing that the goal of criminal punishment goes beyond inflicting harm on 
specific individuals but also includes signifying the society’s moral condemnation of an action).  
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prosecution of humanitarian abusers by ICTs can also serve an expressive 
function in communities afflicted by communal atrocities.66  
But when a formal law criminalizes a certain activity, its expressive 
function might still be very limited if existing informal or alternative 
sanctions are severe enough. Indeed, the expressive function of a formal 
sanction might become progressively diluted once there is a hierarchy of 
alternative communities that also sanction the relevant activity. Consider 
the following example. Suppose that a certain close-knit criminal gang 
sanctions the stealing of drugs from other gang members with the penalty 
of death. Suppose further that the relevant jurisdiction where the gang 
members live decides to also sanction the stealing of drugs and makes it 
punishable by a four-year maximum jail sentence. Would this latter 
sanction have an expressive value to gang members that trumps the 
expressive value of the sanction meted out by the gang leaders? Probably 
not. Indeed, to the extent gang members may tend to identify more closely 
with the gang than with the broader community, the expressive or 
educative function of the formal sanction may be trivial or non-existent.  
Of course, if the relevant alternative community that does the 
sanctioning is even more well-defined than a local gang, for example a 
nation-state within the international community of states, then additional 
sanctions by the international community are likely to have even less of an 
expressive or educative social value. As José Alvarez demonstrates with 
respect to the Rwandan ad hoc tribunal, most victims preferred local 
adjudicatory measures to ICTR prosecutions for the simple reason that 
local tribunals were more likely to be responsive to victims’ preferences 
regarding issues of procedural and substantive justice.67  
Consequently, the relationship between formal and informal sanctions 
underscores the need to examine the tradeoffs that occur when one 
chooses among alternative enforcers. As Bruce Jacobs et al. have 
observed, “[W]hy should offenders elect to reduce their chance of getting 
arrested [by law enforcement] at the cost of increasing their odds of being 
killed [by victims]?”68 From a criminal policy perspective, the idea that 
certain informal sanctions can displace the effect of formally imposed 
sanctions should alert governments that investing their limited resources in 
 
 
 66. See Diane Marie Amann, supra note 6, at 118; see also Drumbl, supra note 4, at 592–95. 
 67. See José E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 365, 410–12 (1999) (“[I]nternational tribunals are accountable to, and respond most readily 
to, international lawyers’ jurisprudential and other agendas and only incidentally to the needs of 
victims of mass atrocity.”). 
 68. Bruce Jacobs et al., supra note 53, at 172. 
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mechanisms that increase incapacitation of offenders may be more 
effective than trying to influence the incentives of a category of criminals 
who are not easily deterred.  
IV. THE EVIDENCE OF THE FATES OF AFRICAN COUP PLOTTERS: 
DEBUNKING THE CULTURE OF IMPUNITY THESIS 
As discussed in Part I, the deterrence rationale for ICTs assumes that 
there is a “culture of impunity” in weak states. As Sadat puts it, “One of 
the primary obstacles to establishing the rule of law . . . has been the 
culture of impunity that has prevailed to date. Genocidal leaders flaunt 
their crimes openly, unconcerned about international reaction, which they 
suspect will range from willful blindness . . . to diplomatic censure . . . .”69 
Commentators often argue that this purported culture of impunity tends to 
exacerbate long-standing cleavages in vulnerable societies and makes 
lasting peace arrangements impossible.70  
At first glance, it does seem that many of the perpetrators of the worst 
kinds of humanitarian atrocities go unpunished. After all, anecdotes 
abound of indicted human rights abusers in the former Yugoslavia who are 
at large and roam freely through the Serbian countryside.71 But looks, 
especially first glances, can be deceiving. To begin, these anecdotes do not 
adequately capture the fates of potential perpetrators who were 
incapacitated before they could do any significant harm to their victims. 
The quick glance also does not capture the true risks and fates of those 
perpetrators who do succeed in their quest to inflict atrocities. For every 
Mladic who seems to escape any formal sanction, there are probably 
dozens, if not hundreds, of other perpetrators of atrocities whose fates are 
less fortunate. In other words, none of the existing anecdotes necessarily 
support the presupposition that an underlying culture of impunity exists in 
weak states. More importantly, to the extent that some perpetrators of 
atrocities do evade punishment, it is not clear how one can evaluate claims 
that ICTs will effectively address any shortcomings or gaps among 
preexisting sanctions in weak states.  
The economic model of crime deterrence offers one promising 
framework for evaluating the deterrence effects of ICTs. As noted above, 
 
 
 69. SADAT, supra note 46, at 49.  
 70. See Kiss, supra note 41.  
 71. See, e.g., Carla Del Ponte, Prosecutor of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Address to the Security Council (Nov. 23, 2004), http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2004/ 
p917-e.htm (describing nearly twenty fugitives named in Security Council resolutions or ICTY 
indictments who remained at large). 
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the model suggests that deterrence of potential perpetrators will depend 
upon the severity and certainty of punishment by ICTs, the individual risk 
preferences of potential perpetrators, and the likelihood of other 
preexisting sanctions.72 The “severity and certainty” factors support the 
claims of scholars that ICT deterrence will only be improved by bolstering 
ICT resources and increasing the frequency of ICT prosecutions. But any 
attempt to apply the economic model of deterrence to ICTs must confront 
the likelihood that preexisting informal and formal sanctions might render 
negligible any additional deterrent effect of ICT prosecutions. In this Part, 
we report on data gathered on a set of individuals who represent likely 
targets of ICT prosecutions—coup plotters in Africa during the post 
independence period. This data suggests that the strong likelihood that a 
perpetrator of humanitarian atrocities will be subject to a range of severe 
and certain preexisting sanctions significantly reduces any expected 
deterrence effect of ICT prosecutions.  
A. The Methodology 
The relatively few ICT prosecutions and even fewer ICT trials make it 
difficult to generalize about the certainty and severity of ICT punishment. 
But the procedural and political constraints that ICTs face make it unlikely 
that they will be the primary vehicles for the prosecution of humanitarian 
atrocities. For instance, under the Rome Statute, the ICC can only 
prosecute claims when the authorities in the affected state are unwilling or 
unable to do so.73 Furthermore, since the ICC and the ad hoc ICTs lack 
any independent enforcement power, they will also have to depend on the 
goodwill of member states to hunt down and prosecute suspects.74 Finally, 
the severity of ICT punishments will likely be constrained by the 
prohibition of capital punishment in all ICT systems.75 While the small 
sample of ICT prosecutions makes it difficult to generalize at this stage 
 
 
 72. See discussion in Part III. 
 73. Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 17(1)(a) (requiring ICC Prosecutor to deem inadmissible 
any case “being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is 
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution”). 
 74. See Goldsmith, supra note 9 (arguing that United States non-participation undermines ICT 
enforcement).  
 75. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 77(1)(b) (allowing maximum penalty of life 
imprisonment “when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime”); Statute of the Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, art. 24(1) (May 25, 1993) (amended Feb. 28, 2006), available at http://www.un. 
org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/statut/statute-feb06-e.pdf (penalties “limited to imprisonment”); Statute for 
the International Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 23 (Nov. 8, 1994), available at http://69.94.11.53/ 
ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html (penalties limited to imprisonment).  
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about the likely severity of future ICT sanctions, it is safe to assume that 
such sanctions will be limited to prison sentences or property forfeiture.76  
One aspect of the deterrence model, however, can be tested empirically 
over a broad set of data. One can assess the deterrence effect of ICTs in 
part by reviewing the likelihood that an ICT target would be subject to 
alternative sanctions. Even if the certainty of ICT punishments is assumed 
to be quite robust, the comparatively greater certainty of other preexisting 
sanctions might undermine the deterrence effect of ICTs. Similarly, if the 
severity of preexisting sanctions is likely to be greater than the severity of 
ICT punishments, this too would reduce or eliminate any deterrence effect 
of ICTs.  
An empirical study which evaluates the likelihood and severity of 
preexisting informal and formal sanctions could test the extent of this 
substitution effect. Such a study would not resolve conclusively the 
question of the certainty of ICT prosecutions, but it might make such a 
determination unnecessary. Even if there is a significant probability of an 
ICT prosecution for every category of humanitarian atrocities (a highly 
unlikely and generous assumption), it might nonetheless be swamped by 
the greater deterrence effect of preexisting formal and informal sanctions.  
B. The Data: Isolating Likely Humanitarian Offenders 
The first task in assessing the deterrence effect of ICTs is to isolate the 
group of individuals most likely to be prosecuted by ICTs. To do so, we 
review data gathered on the fates of African coup participants for the 
period 1955–2003. This information was collected in part from a data set 
on coup events in Africa put together by Patrick McGowan.77 McGowan’s 
data set covers all military coups d’etat, failed coups, and reported coup 
plots for all independent African states from January 1956 through 
December 2003. We built upon McGowan’s database by assembling an 
expanded data set that examines the fates of the coup participants in each 
category of coup events. We gathered most of our information from a 
variety of news sources, including the following: archives on the Lexis-
Nexis news service, descriptive data files from McGowan’s event file, 
online newspaper sources like the New York Times, and John Wiseman’s 
Political Leaders in Black Africa: A Biographical African Dictionary of 
 
 
 76. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 77(2) (allowing property forfeiture as penalty).  
 77. Patrick J. McGowan, Intervention Event File (2003) (on file with authors).  
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the Major Politicians Since Independence.78 Where multiple coup 
participants were involved in a single event and were subject to different 
fates, we coded the outcome by listing the most severe fate faced by any of 
the coup participants. Where we were unable to verify an authoritative 
news account of the fate of a coup participant, we simply listed the fate of 
the coup participant as unknown.  
Ideally, to examine the probability that African humanitarian offenders 
are likely to face preexisting sanctions, we would want information on the 
fates of participants in every civil war, insurrection, coup event, and 
violent suppression of political opposition that has occurred in Africa 
since independence of the various African states. Unfortunately, given the 
complex and messy nature of most armed insurrections and violent 
suppressions, a comprehensive account of such events does not exist. One 
of the benefits of using the fates of African coup participants is that it 
codes all known attempts to overthrow a regime in Africa, even if those 
attempts ultimately failed. But the data are likely to omit a certain number 
of potential humanitarian offenders, such as those African leaders who 
attempt to use violence to suppress the political opposition of those 
individuals whose ultimate ambition is not to overthrow or change the 
regime in power. As many of those who seek to suppress political 
resistance by brute force in Africa have come into power by means of a 
coup d’etat, this omission should not bias the information presented here 
in any significant way. That is, since the data gives an overall picture of 
the fates of all African coup participants, it necessarily subsumes the fates 
of those coup participants who subsequently attempted to suppress the 
political opposition. But even if the pool of coup participants does not 
overlap significantly with humanitarian offenders, we have no reason to 
think that the fates faced by coup participants are going to be significantly 
different from those faced by humanitarian offenders.  
In any event, the data set we have assembled offers a rich source of 
descriptive empirical evidence on preexisting sanctions likely to be faced 
by ICT defendants. This is because a large proportion of ICT prosecutions 
seek to punish individuals engaged in civil or intra-national conflict.79 
Indeed, all of the ad hoc U.N. ICTs have been set up to prosecute war 
crimes occurring within a single state during a time of civil war. These 
wars have inevitably been characterized by power struggles among rival 
 
 
 78. JOHN A. WISEMAN, POLITICAL LEADERS IN BLACK AFRICA: BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF 
MAJOR POLITICIANS SINCE INDEPENDENCE (1991).  
 79. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (Rwanda); S.C. Res. 808, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993) (Yugo.). 
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groups seeking political power in weak states. Humanitarian atrocities, 
especially those ordered by individuals at the highest level of government, 
almost always occur in the context of a power struggle between ethnic 
groups or rival factions.80 More importantly, such atrocities almost always 
occur in a “weak state” that is unable or unwilling to prosecute such 
offenders.81  
Coup events in Africa follow a similar fact pattern. African coups often 
occur in weak states characterized by unstable political systems and 
substantial internal ethnic conflict.82 Moreover, African coup plotters tend 
to employ significant violence to achieve their political objectives. Once 
they are successfully ensconced in power, the former coup plotters 
themselves often become afraid of being removed by force and are likely 
to employ oppressive measures to silence any real or imagined political 
opponents.  
Given Africa’s propensity for coups d’etat and civil wars,83 it is not 
surprising then that all of the existing ICC cases are located in Africa 
(Sudan, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo), and that two of 
the United Nations’ four ad hoc tribunals are set up to prosecute 
humanitarian atrocities that have occurred in Africa (Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone). In all of these cases, the humanitarian atrocities were ordered or 
permitted by either incumbent officials seeking to put down a civil 
rebellion or by rebels seeking to oust the existing government.84  
African coup participants, including coup opponents, thus provide a 
grim but potentially illustrative data set for exploring the incentives facing 
 
 
 80. The two ad hoc U.N. ICTs were set up to prosecute crimes in two such states: the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The wars in both Yugoslavia and Rwanda arose out of conflicts between 
different religious and ethnic groups, as opposed to ideological or other divisions. See SCHARF, 
BALKAN JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 21–37; GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A 
GENOCIDE 229–30 (1995). 
 81. For instance, all states that have been subject to ICT prosecutions (Yugoslavia, Rwanda, 
Congo, Sudan, Cambodia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) rank in the top twenty of the “Failed States 
Index” published by the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy magazine. The index rates countries on 
twelve factors including criminalization of the state, progressive deterioration of public services, and 
widespread violation of human rights. See Foreign Policy & The Fund for Peace, The Failed State 
Index, FOREIGN POLICY, May/June 2006, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php? 
story_id=3420. 
 82. See id. 
 83. Studies of conflict patterns across the world suggest that Africa is the region most prone to 
civil conflict. See Paul Collier & Anke Hoefller, On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa, 46 J. 
CONFLICT RES. 13, 13 (2002). Similarly, other studies show that Africa is the most coup-prone region 
of the world. See Patrick J. McGowan, African Military Coups D’Etat, 1956–2001: Frequency, 
Trends, and Distribution, 41 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 339, 341 (2003).  
 84. See RAY TARAS & RAJAT GANGULY, UNDERSTANDING ETHNIC CONFLICT: THE 
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION 225–46 (1998). 
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likely targets of future ICT prosecutions. For the foreseeable future, it is 
likely that most ICT prosecutions, both of the ad hoc and permanent 
variety, will involve defendants who sought to achieve political change or 
consolidation through violent means in weak or failed states.  
C. Findings 
As noted above, to know whether ICT prosecutions will make a 
difference we need to look at the likely fates of African coup participants 
absent ICT intervention—a group that is likely to include targets of ICT 
prosecutions. From such a look, it is not self-evident that ICT prosecutions 
will make any difference.  
Consider first the fates of those who venture into national politics in 
Africa, not just those who seek to overthrow or change existing 
governments through violence. As Wiseman observes, of the 485 
individuals who became political leaders in Africa prior to 1991, an 
astonishing 59.4% suffered unfortunate fates directly linked to their 
political activities.85 Indeed, of Wiseman’s entire database of African 
leaders, 17.7% were killed, and another 41.6% either suffered 
imprisonment or exile or both. Put differently, more than one-half of all 
African leaders since independence through 1991 have been killed, 
imprisoned, or exiled.86 Thus, from a rationalist perspective it would seem 
that only individuals with a taste for personal danger and high risk would 
tend to seek political office in Africa.  
Obviously, generalizations about the risks of seeking political office in 
Africa are subject to some important qualifications. For instance, countries 
as varied as South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius, Senegal, and Namibia 
have all exhibited historically high levels of political stability and 
economic growth and seem to be largely immune to the leadership risks 
described above. But for most sub-Saharan African states, peaceful 
transitions from political office appear to be the exception rather than the 
norm. Indeed, most coups d’etat in the world today take place in Africa.87 
However, as Table 1 indicates, the outcomes of African coups d’etat are 
subject to considerable variation across countries, and a significant 
proportion of such coups end in failure.  
 
 
 85. John Wiseman, Leadership and Personal Danger in African Politics, 31 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 
657, 659 (1993).  
 86. Id. at 658–59. 
 87. See McGowan, supra note 83, at 341. 
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TABLE 1: INCIDENCE OF VARIOUS AFRICAN COUP EVENTS,  
1955–200388 
 
Country Total 
Events 
 
Failed Coups 
(Proportions in 
parentheses) 
Coup Plots 
(Proportions in 
parentheses) 
Successful Coups 
(Proportions in 
parentheses) 
Angola 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Cent. Afr. Rep. 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo 
Congo (DRC) 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Djibouti 
Eq. Guinea 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mozambique 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
São Tomé & 
 Príncipe  
Senegal 
Seychelles 
1 
15 
14 
14 
2 
12 
9 
10 
11 
11 
8 
1 
7 
11 
4 
5 
22 
12 
10 
3 
6 
15 
4 
3 
7 
10 
2 
6 
12 
2 
2 
 
1 
1 
1 (1.00) 
3 (.20) 
1 (.07) 
7 (.50) 
1 (.50) 
5 (.42) 
5 (.56) 
6 (.60) 
5 (.45) 
1 (.09) 
3 (.38) 
1 (1.00) 
3 (.43) 
2 (.18) 
1 (.25) 
2 (.40) 
6 (.27) 
2 (.17) 
2 (.20) 
1 (.33) 
1 (.17) 
3 (.20) 
2 (.50) 
0 (.00) 
0 (.00) 
2 (.20) 
1 (.50) 
2 (.33) 
2 (.17) 
0 (.00) 
0 (.00) 
 
1 (1.00) 
0 (.00) 
0 (.00) 
6 (.40) 
7 (.50) 
2 (.14) 
1 (.50) 
3 (.25) 
1 (.11) 
1 (.10) 
4 (.36) 
7 (.64) 
4 (.50) 
0 (.00) 
3 (.43) 
5 (.45) 
3 (.75) 
1 (.20) 
11 (.50) 
9 (.75) 
5 (.50) 
2 (.67) 
1 (.17) 
11 (.73) 
1 (.25) 
3 (1.00) 
5 (.71) 
5 (.50) 
1 (.50) 
1 (.17) 
4 (.33) 
1 (.50) 
1 (.50) 
 
0 (.00) 
0 (.00) 
0 (.00) 
6 (.40) 
6 (.43) 
5 (.36) 
0 (.00) 
4 (.33) 
3 (.33) 
3 (.30) 
2 (.18) 
3 (.27) 
1 (.13) 
0 (.00) 
1 (.14) 
4 (.36) 
0 (.00) 
2 (.40) 
5 (.23) 
1 (.08) 
3 (.30) 
0 (.00) 
4 (.67) 
1 (.07) 
1 (.25) 
0 (.00) 
2 (.29) 
3 (.30) 
0 (.00) 
3 (.50) 
6 (.50) 
1 (.50) 
1 (.50) 
 
0 (.00) 
1 (1.00) 
 
 
 88. Using McGowan’s terminology, a successful coup refers to a forceful overthrow of a present 
government; failed coups are such efforts that fail; coup plots are when the government announces that 
it has discovered a conspiracy to overthrow the government. See id. at 339–44. 
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Country Total 
Events 
 
Failed Coups 
(Proportions in 
parentheses) 
Coup Plots 
(Proportions in 
parentheses) 
Successful Coups 
(Proportions in 
parentheses) 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Total 
17 
6 
1 
32 
3 
3 
11 
17 
4 
1 
348 
7 (.41) 
2 (.33) 
0 (.00) 
11 (.34) 
1 (.33) 
1 .(33) 
6 (.55) 
8 (.47) 
3 (.75) 
1 (1.00) 
112 (.32) 
5 (.29) 
3 (.50) 
1 (1.00) 
17 (.53) 
1 (.33) 
2 (.67) 
3 (.27) 
5 (.29) 
1 (.25) 
0 (.00) 
147 (.42) 
5 (.29) 
1 (.17) 
0 (.00) 
4 (.13) 
1 (.33) 
0 (.00) 
2 (.18) 
4 (.24) 
0 (.00) 
0 (.00) 
89 (.26) 
 
A close look at the fates of these coup participants suggests that trying 
to seek political change in Africa through violence is an extremely 
dangerous activity. For instance, of all coup participants in Africa during 
the relevant period, including those who were successful, 28% were 
executed or otherwise murdered, 22% were exiled or imprisoned, and 16% 
were arrested without any clear outcomes. Of course, failure often entails 
even more dire consequences for coup participants. As Table 2 below 
indicates, 35% of all individuals who engaged in failed coups were 
executed or otherwise murdered, 27% were imprisoned or exiled, and 16% 
were arrested without any clear outcomes. Similarly, 32% of all 
individuals who engaged in coup plots were executed or otherwise 
murdered, 27% were imprisoned or exiled, and 21% were arrested without 
any clear outcomes.  
TABLE 2: FATES OF AFRICAN COUP PARTICIPANTS, 1955–2003 
 
Coup 
Events 
Total 
Number 
of 
Actors 
Executed/
Murdered/ 
Died in 
Prison  
Imprisoned Exiled/ 
Tried in 
Absentia
Arrested Fired/ 
Demoted
No  
Information 
Failed 
Coups 
279 .35 .22 .05 .16 .02 .08 
Coup Plots 370 .32 .24 .03 .21 .05 .09 
Successful 
Coups 
136 .01 0 0 0 0 0 
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Coup 
Events 
Total 
Number 
of 
Actors 
Executed/
Murdered/ 
Died in 
Prison  
Imprisoned Exiled/ 
Tried in 
Absentia
Arrested Fired/ 
Demoted
No  
Information 
All Coup 
Events 
785 .28 .19 .03 .16 .03 .07 
 
 
If we isolate the most coup-prone countries in Africa, the fates of coup 
participants are much worse. A breakdown of the data among those 
African countries that have witnessed eleven or more coups d’etat, as in 
Table 3, suggests that the probability that coup participants will be killed 
or imprisoned is still significant in the African states most accustomed to 
coups d’etat.  
TABLE 3: FATES OF COUP PARTICIPANTS IN THE MOST COUP-PRONE 
AFRICAN STATES (AFRICAN STATES WITH ELEVEN OR MORE COUP EVENTS, 
1955–2003) 
Countries Executed/ 
Murdered/ 
Died in Prison 
(Failed Coups) 
Imprisoned 
(Failed 
Coups) 
Executed/ 
Murdered/ 
Died in Prison
(Coup Plots) 
Imprisoned 
(Coup Plots)
Executed/ 
Murdered/ 
Died in Prison
(All events) 
Imprisoned 
(All events)
Benin .17 .17 .07 .71 .08 .41 
Burkina Faso .00 .00 .67 .07 .39 .04 
Burundi .05 .50 .75 .00 .13 .33 
Cent. Afr. Rep. .30 .30 .20 .00 .21 .16 
Congo .54 .23 .22 .22 .35 .19 
Congo (DRC) 1.00 .00 .71 .18 .57 .13 
Ethiopia 1.00 .00 .69 .00 .69 .00 
Ghana .31 .04 .37 .27 .29 .16 
Guinea .78 .11 .06 .06 .31 .08 
Liberia .22 .22 .39 .26 .35 .24 
Nigeria .67 .17 .73 .28 .50 .18 
Sierra Leone .44 .00 .00 .31 .17 .09 
Sudan .42 .00 .00 .32 .20 .14 
Togo .36 .00 .00 .00 .23 .00 
Uganda .30 .10 .72 .00 .38 .04 
Total .40 .13 .38 .22 .31 .15 
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Note that this data understates to a significant degree the full risks 
associated with participating in African coups d’etat. The data only 
focuses on what happens to coup participants at the time they seek to 
obtain power. But even after successfully obtaining power, African coup 
participants are subject to a wide range of risks. Indeed, a considerable 
number of successful African coup participants have been assassinated or 
killed in coup plots after obtaining power, including: Aguiyi Ironsi and 
Murtala Muhammed in Nigeria, Samuel Doe in Liberia, Macias Nguema 
in Equatorial Guinea, and Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso.89 
Beyond the significant risks of death faced by African coup 
participants, the dangers they face when imprisoned are likely to be 
different from those faced by offenders subject to prosecution by ICTs. As 
various human rights groups have documented, African prisons are 
notoriously overcrowded, under-funded, and prone to significant riots and 
outbreaks of disease.90 Moreover, political prisoners in Africa are often 
subject to a wide range of degrading and inhumane treatment—such as 
torture, physical abuse, and public humiliation—treatment that one is 
unlikely to encounter in prison facilities administered by ICTs.91 
More generally, political regimes in Africa are likely to have more 
flexibility than ICTs in tailoring sanctions in response to disfavored 
humanitarian offenses. ICTs are limited by their mandate to administering 
prison sentences, which some economists have conjectured might be less 
efficient in deterring crimes than certain forms of corporal punishment.92 
But African regimes, especially of the non-democratic variety, can elect to 
use a mix of corporal and non-corporal sanctions to attain the optimal 
amount of deterrence against potential humanitarian offenders. Of course, 
as a normative matter, many alternative sanctions might be legally or 
morally problematic. As a practical matter, however, such considerations 
do not seem to constrain the choices of many African politicians.  
 
 
 89. See Wiseman, supra note 85, at 659. 
 90. See, e.g., Alex Last, The Notorious Jails of Nigeria, BBC Africa News Service, Apr. 7, 2006, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4880592.stm; Human Rights Watch Prison Project, 
Prisons in Africa, http://www.hrw.org/advocacy/prisons/africa.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2006). 
 91. See Human Rights Watch Prison Project, supra note 90 (describing typical treatment of 
political prisoners in Africa). For how ICT prisons treat prisoners, see Rome Statute, supra note 18, 
art. 106 (“The enforcement of a sentence of imprisonment shall be subject to the supervision of the 
Court and shall be consistent with widely accepted international treaty standards governing treatment 
of prisoners.”). For a discussion of the international system for incarcerating prisoners, see Dirk van 
Zyl Smit, International Imprisonment, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 357, 357–58 (2005). 
 92. See Abraham L. Wickelgren, Justifying Imprisonment: On the Optimality of Excessively 
Costly Punishment, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 377 (2003).  
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D. Implications for the Deterrence Effect of ICT Prosecutions 
The data above reflects the extent to which a pool of likely perpetrators 
of humanitarian atrocities face preexisting sanctions for their activities. 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom that such perpetrators operate in a 
culture of impunity, we have shown that those in Africa routinely face 
sanctions which are likely to be more severe and certain than any meted 
out by any existing or future ICT. Indeed, more often than not, the 
individuals who self-select into efforts to effect political change in Africa 
are killed or imprisoned. 
In other words, our study suggests that perpetrators of humanitarian 
atrocities are going to be high-risk individuals who are not likely to be 
significantly deterred by the prospect of further prosecution by ICTs. 
Because coup participants in Africa, a representative sample of potential 
humanitarian offenders, appear to discount significantly the risks that they 
might get killed or tortured for their activities, they are also likely to 
discount the risks of ICT prosecutions.  
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the fates of coup participants 
improve when we focus on the most coup-prone African states. Indeed, the 
data in Table 3 suggest the opposite—that the probability of death or 
imprisonment tends to be higher in the more coup-prone African states. 
One would expect that if coup participants were responsive to punitive 
sanctions, there would be a drop-off in the number of coups planned in 
those African states where the risks of death and imprisonment were 
acutely high. Indeed, in the coup-prone Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), a country commonly singled out by human rights activists as 
emblematic of a culture of impunity and one of the first states to be 
targeted for atrocity investigations by the ICC, a staggering 57% of all 
coup participants were executed and another 13% were imprisoned. If we 
narrow the Congolese evidence to coup plots, then 71% of the participants 
were executed; for failed coups, 100% of participants were executed.  
The significance of these findings becomes more pronounced when we 
compare them to domestically available data on the probability that one 
would be caught and convicted for a serious violent crime. Take, for 
instance, the data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) on clearance rates—the percentage of known 
crimes for which there is an arrest and charge—and conviction rates for 
violent crimes in the United States. The FBI data suggest that enforcement 
authorities clear about 49% of all violent offenses, while the DOJ’s data 
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suggests that the conviction rate for such offenses is about 88%.93 Thus, a 
fair estimate of the probability that an individual will get caught and 
convicted for a violent crime in the United States is about 43%. Of course, 
since not all violent crimes are reported, this data probably significantly 
overstates the probability of being caught and convicted.94  
There has been no comparable study of the probability of being caught 
and punished by an ICT for committing a humanitarian atrocity. There is 
little reason to believe, however, that ICTs will be able to achieve 
anything close to the levels of punishment achieved domestically.95 For 
instance, the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has tried only 
twenty-six individuals in its seven-year existence (at a cost of $1 billion) 
and has only twenty-six trials underway.96 Only twenty additional 
individuals have been indicted, and the tribunal estimates that it may 
complete sixty-five to seventy trials by the time its mandate expires in 
2008.97 Comparing this number of trials to the huge number of potential 
offenders (in Rwanda, the government itself at one point claimed 130,000 
offenders),98 one surmises that the ICTR might eventually prosecute 
approximately 0.005% of the pool of the likely humanitarian offenders in 
the Rwandan civil war—a figure that makes it highly unlikely that the 
ICTR will exert even a marginal deterrent effect on future humanitarian 
offenders.99  
These numbers make it easier to assess whether adding a new range of 
sanctions against African coup participants is likely to make any 
meaningful difference. In many respects, the United States data on the 
clearance and arrest rates for violent crimes paints a fairly pessimistic 
 
 
 93. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS CRIME 
IN THE UNITED STATES 1998 (1998); U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS 402 (1998). The rate of prosecution for certain types of crimes may also be substantially 
less. A 1988 statistical survey concluded that suspects were arrested in only three million of about 
thirty-four million serious crimes in the United States in 1986. A.B.A. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A FREE SOCIETY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 4–5 (1988). 
 94. For instance, Levitt estimates that victims only report 38% of crimes committed, which 
means that the conviction rates are probably not quite correct. See Levitt, supra note 47, at 369. 
 95. The Nuremberg Tribunal, for instance, is estimated to have prosecuted no more than 3.5% of 
all suspected German war criminals. See Amann, supra note 29. 
 96. President of International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Completion Strategy of 
International Tribunal for Rwanda, Letter of December 5, 2005, addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/782 (Dec. 14, 2005), available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/ 
completionstrat/s-2005-782e.pdf. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Helena Cobban, International Courts, FOREIGN POL’Y, Mar./Apr. 2006, at 22, 26.  
 99. It is possible that all of this data suggests that deterrence is unlikely for even domestic 
criminal law systems. For our purposes, however, it is enough to demonstrate that the likelihood of 
deterrence is substantially less in the case of international criminal systems. 
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picture of what we might expect of ICTs. Given that African coup 
participants face comparably higher sanctions than violent criminals in the 
United States, one might safely conjecture that the coup participants are 
likely to engage in their activities no matter how large the expected ICT 
sanction might be. Put differently, if it turns out that the expected benefit 
of participating in coup activities or engaging in humanitarian atrocities is 
high enough, we may safely conclude that African coup participants will 
consider the risk factors outlined above and discount them. 
Anecdotal evidence of contemporary indicted humanitarian offenders 
supports the claim that the individuals who select into these kind of 
activities are likely to be very difficult to deter. Take, for instance, the case 
of Charles Taylor, the former president of Liberia who has been labeled 
one of the most egregious humanitarian offenders in recent memory.100 
Taylor first gained notoriety when as a minister in the Liberian 
government he stole funds from the regime of Samuel Doe—then one of 
the most brutal despots in West Africa. He fled to the United States, was 
arrested by the FBI, and then escaped American federal custody while 
awaiting extradition. He then fled to the Libyan desert where he 
commanded a crew of rebels who subsequently managed to force Doe out 
of power in Liberia. Taylor’s regime immediately became embroiled in a 
massive civil war which lasted over seven years. In 2003, at the height of 
the civil war and as rebel forces were encroaching upon the Liberian 
capital, Taylor intervened simultaneously in two civil wars in neighboring 
Sierra Leone and Guinea.101 Indeed, his current indictment is for atrocities 
he and his troops committed during the civil war in Sierra Leone.102 
Regardless of what one thinks of Taylor as a moral agent, he was clearly 
an individual who courted significant and dangerous risks in his political 
life. In sum, he was a prime political opportunist who seemed nearly 
undeterrable in his quest to amass rents from public office.  
Of course, none of this data conclusively resolves the question of 
whether humanitarian offenders in Africa or elsewhere will always be 
difficult to deter. The lack of any hard evidence on how humanitarian 
 
 
 100. See, e.g., Donna Bryson, Case Strikes a Blow Against African Despotism, FORT WORTH 
STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 2, 2006, at A21 (describing Taylor as being “accused of greed and savagery 
extraordinary even for a continent that has known some of the worst tyrants of modern times”); David 
Wallechinsky, The World’s Ten Worst Dictators, PARADE MAG., Feb. 16, 2003, available at 
http://www.parade.com/articles/editions/2003/edition_02-16-2003/Dictators. 
 101. For background on Liberia’s civil war, see U.S. Dep’t of State, Background Note: Liberia 
(Sept. 2006), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6618.htm. 
 102. Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Amended Indictment (Mar. 17, 
2006), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/SCSL-03-01-I-75.pdf. 
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offenders actually respond to ICT prosecutions suggests that our findings 
should be treated with caution. First, the data we provide here is 
descriptive and does not purport to show that coup participants or 
humanitarian offenders will never respond to threats of ICT prosecution. 
Second, our project does not purport to use any econometric methods that 
might show the lack of correlation between ICT prosecutions and the 
commission of humanitarian offenses. Thus, it remains possible that in the 
future, scholars who have the benefit of a more detailed set of prosecution 
data could demonstrate a robust link between ICT prosecutions and 
deterrence.  
Finally, our analysis is limited in that the data here focuses more 
generally on the risks to individuals trying to achieve political change in 
Africa by force of arms, rather than on the more specific risks faced by 
individuals engaging in humanitarian atrocities. To be sure, many coup 
events that take place in Africa are not necessarily accompanied by efforts 
by the coup participants to commit atrocities. But it seems that the risks 
faced by those individuals who try to achieve political change or maintain 
political power by force will necessarily subsume the risks faced by many 
of those individuals who attempt to attain similar objectives by 
committing large scale humanitarian atrocities. The overlap in the data 
will not, of course, be perfect because there will be those who commit 
atrocities without seeking to overthrow the existing political regime. 
Nonetheless, given the inherent limitations in trying to select a subset of 
likely humanitarian offenders that is divorced from objective accounts of 
efforts to overthrow governments, we believe that coup participants 
represent a second-best proxy for likely humanitarian offenders. 
Moreover, there is no strong theoretical reason to assume a priori that 
humanitarian offenders in Africa are going to face systematically lower 
sanction risks than coup participants.  
With these caveats in mind, it is worth noting that the evidence we 
have gathered so far is in considerable tension with the supposition of ICT 
proponents that there is an underlying culture of impunity within which 
humanitarian offenders act. In the decades since most African states 
became independent, coups and civil wars have multiplied, resulting in 
fairly severe consequences for a majority of the participants. If we 
acknowledge the severity and certainty of the range of sanctions faced by 
these participants, then the deterrent effects of further prosecutions by 
ICTs are likely to be insignificant. Moreover, because of the selection bias 
in the data—the probable underreporting of the dismal fates of coup 
participants because of the exclusion from the data of what subsequently 
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happened to successful coup plotters—it is likely that the preexisting 
sanctions are even more severe than the data we have presented indicates.  
V. OPPORTUNITIES VERSUS WILLINGNESS TO COMMIT ATROCITIES 
Given that the expected level of sanctions associated with committing 
atrocities is high, why is there a relative concentration of humanitarian 
atrocities in weak states, especially in Africa? After all, the economic 
model of deterrence suggests that informal and formal sanctions ought to 
deter potential coup participants or warlords from engaging in 
humanitarian atrocities. We do not attempt to offer a definitive answer to 
this question, although we offer one possible explanation based on the 
distinction between the willingness and the opportunity to commit 
atrocities. Individuals in mature states tend to commit fewer atrocities than 
individuals in weak states, but not because they fear formal sanctions. 
Rather, fewer atrocities are committed because there are fewer occasions 
for individuals in mature states to do so.  
According to this view, the ability of more mature states to withstand 
significant outbreaks of humanitarian atrocities rests largely on the 
presence of strong institutions that provide law and order, a free and 
effective press, and political participation.103 As political scientists have 
argued, stable institutions in mature democracies usually ensure that 
political leaders will be accountable to their domestic constituencies; in 
turn, such accountability makes war between such regimes104 and coup 
plots within such regimes105 less likely. These same institutional features 
may also make acts of humanitarian atrocities less likely in mature 
states.106 Indeed, the presence of a robust civil society and civil institutions 
 
 
 103. Admittedly, the last two factors are probably more characteristic of mature democracies than 
of mature states generally. But with the possible exception of China, mature democracies define most 
of the strongest states in existence today. 
 104. See, e.g., BRUCE RUSSETT, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE (1995); Bruce Bueno de 
Mesquita, An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 791 (1999). 
 105. D.A. HIBBS, MASS POLITICAL VIOLENCE: A CROSS NATIONAL ANALYSIS 102 (1973) 
(“Weakly institutionalized societies . . . are far more likely than those with highly developed 
institutions to suffer . . . political interventions by the military.”).  
 106. Take, for instance, the logic of suicide terrorism in more mature states. All else being equal, a 
suicide terrorist might prefer to inflict the greatest number of casualties on citizens when he selects a 
target. What prevents the suicide terrorist from realizing his goal is obviously not deterrence, but the 
fact that he lacks the opportunity to carry out his criminal enterprise on such a grand scale. He might 
be willing to make the ultimate sacrifice and give his life, but he might often find his efforts thwarted 
by the existence of a sophisticated security apparatus. In other words, because the military and 
enforcement capacities in mature states completely dwarf the resources of most prospective 
entrepreneurs of mass violence, it is less likely that such entrepreneurs will ever be able to carry out 
their enterprise to fruition. In his excellent study of the strategy of suicide terrorists, Pape argues that 
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increases the chance that citizens will resist even minor attempts to 
mobilize groups that will engage in humanitarian atrocities.107  
By contrast, weak and unstable states—in which most contemporary 
humanitarian atrocities take place—often lack the basic institutional 
structures needed to facilitate the rule of law and governmental control. As 
various political scientists have pointed out, regimes in weak states tend to 
suffer from widespread corruption, lack the ability to guarantee law and 
order throughout their territory, and usually cannot fulfill their 
international obligations.108 Even when they do attempt to exert their 
authority, regimes in weak states are often prone to doing so in an 
incompetent, arbitrary, and officious manner; thus, political scientists have 
taken to labeling such states “weak leviathans.”109 Finally, the militaries or 
security forces in weak states are often plagued by organizational 
ineffectiveness, corruption, and lack of resources.110  
Significantly, the inability of militaries or police forces in many weak 
states to guarantee basic security means that such states are often 
susceptible to violent attacks from fringe or disgruntled elements. For 
instance, in Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan, the failure of 
successive regimes to manage their territories has spawned a series of 
rebellions in those states.111 Although many of these rebel groups are 
disorganized and lack many of the characteristics of a modern fighting 
 
 
the best way to constrain suicide terrorists is to “reduce [their] confidence in their ability to carry out 
such attacks on the target society.” Robert A. Pape, The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, 97 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 343, 344 (2003). Of course, Pape’s recommendations assume that the relevant society 
would have both the resources and political might to influence the terrorist’s confidence. 
 107. See HIBBS, supra note 105. 
 108. See ROBERT JACKSON, QUASI-STATES: SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE 
THIRD WORLD (1990); Jeffrey Herbst, Responding to State Failure in Africa, 21 INT’L SEC., Winter 
1996-1997, at 120, 120.  
 109. See Jeffery Herbst, War and the State in Africa 14 INT’L SEC. 117, 125 (1990) (citing 
Thomas M. Callaghy, The State and the Development of Capitalism in Africa: Theoretical, Historical, 
and Comparative Reflections, in THE PRECARIOUS BALANCE: STATE AND SOCIETY IN AFRICA 82 
(Donald Rothchild & Naomi Chazan eds., 1988)). 
 110. As Decalo has written, “[M]any African militaries bear little resemblance to a modern 
complex organizational model and are instead a coterie of armed camps owing primary clientelist 
allegiance to a handful of mutually competitive officers of different ranks seething with a variety of 
corporate, ethnic, and personal grievances.” SAMUEL DECALO, COUPS AND ARMY RULE IN AFRICA: 
STUDIES IN MILITARY STYLE 14–15 (1976). 
 111. For some general background on these countries’ difficulties, see The CIA World Factbook 
entries. Chad, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cd.html (describing flawed 
constitutional elections and subsequent rebellion); Liberia, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ 
factbook/geos/li.html (describing fourteen years of intermittent fighting following fall of Samuel 
Doe’s government in 1990); Sierra Leone, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sl.html 
(describing civil war lasting from 1991 to 2002); Sudan, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ 
factbook/geos/su.html (describing civil war lasting from 1983 to present). 
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force, African military forces have often proven incapable of constraining 
them. As Herbst has observed, “[V]ery few African armies have won 
outright victories against rebels or have been able to change the military 
facts on the ground so that insurgents have to sue for peace.”112  
The shortcomings of African militaries imply that whole communities 
are routinely subject to the arbitrary whims of military-type groups that 
have displaced the state’s authority in a region. Once these groups have 
consolidated their power, they usually seek to strip the communities under 
their control of any remnants of central state authority, such as the power 
to tax or enforce order. In Africa, the most vicious of these groups usually 
take the form of warlord armies or criminal syndicates; the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone and the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) in Uganda are notorious examples.113 Regardless of their 
objectives, these groups tend to deploy brutal tactics to sanction detractors 
or to consolidate power. For instance, the LRA has often used mutilation, 
child abduction, and sex slavery to create a climate of fear and 
intimidation among the Acholi communities of northern Uganda.114 As 
Vinci has observed, the fear factor has served the LRA well by enabling a 
relatively tiny group that lacks any modern military equipment to hold a 
sixty-thousand-man Ugandan army at bay.115 
Beyond weak militaries, African states often lack the robust civil 
society structures that help regimes constructively channel dissent and 
political demands. As Huntington has suggested, when rising public 
expectations in a weak state surpass the ability of political institutions to 
manage such expectations, the end result is usually the kind of chaotic 
political environment that is ripe for coup plots and civil unrest.116 In this 
kind of setting, citizens are less able to resist violent attempts by 
insurgents and other groups to undermine the state’s authority. More 
significantly, the state itself may decide to shortchange its citizens and 
engage in the same kind of predatory activity associated with the rebel 
groups. For instance, military forces from Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and 
 
 
 112. Jeffrey Herbst, African Militaries and Rebellion: The Political Economy of Threat and 
Combat Effectiveness, 41 J. PEACE RES. 357, 358 (2004). 
 113. For some background discussion on the rise of the warlord-led Revolutionary United Front 
group in Sierra Leone, see Jeremy I. Levitt, Illegal Peace? An Inquiry Into Power-Sharing with 
Warlords and Rebels in Africa, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 495, 511–14 (2006). For a briefer discussion of 
the rise of the Lord’s Resistance Army and its classification as a warlord group, see Anthony Vinci, 
The Strategic Use of Fear by the Lord’s Resistance Army, 16 SMALL WARS AND INSURGENCIES 360, 
363 (2005). 
 114. See Vinci, supra note 113, at 370. 
 115. See id. at 374. 
 116. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (1968). 
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Uganda all attempted to take over the lucrative trade in diamonds, gold, 
and copper during the Congolese civil war.117 Similarly, Charles Taylor’s 
regime in Liberia systematically plundered that country’s diamond 
resources as well as the natural resources of neighboring Sierra Leone.118 
These structural conditions allowing for atrocities are often non-
existent or trivial in more mature states. Thus, in judging whether a 
strategy for reducing humanitarian atrocities might work, it is important to 
understand whether the domestic institutional environment makes 
atrocities more likely in the first place. If the institutional ability to 
incapacitate humanitarian abusers varies across countries, then we would 
expect the level of atrocities to depend on country-specific institutional 
arrangements unrelated to the willingness of individual perpetrators to 
commit atrocities.  
Thus, even though the evidence on the fates of African coup plotters in 
Part III suggests strongly that acquiring political power by force in Africa 
is fraught with significant risks, a majority of the coup plots and civil wars 
in the world today still take place in Africa.119 The reason for this apparent 
paradox is that fragile domestic institutions tend to make the environment 
ripe for humanitarian atrocities regardless of the motivations of the 
perpetrators. In other words, rather than attributing to weak African states 
a culture of impunity where perpetrators of atrocities go unpunished, it is 
more likely that these states possess an enabling environment where 
atrocities can easily be committed regardless of whether the perpetrators 
are punished or fear punishment. It should therefore come as no surprise 
that the worst humanitarian atrocities in Africa usually occur in the most 
fragile and vulnerable states on the continent—Sierra Leone, Sudan, 
Congo, Central African Republic, and Liberia.120 
Our theoretical framework does not suggest that all states that lack 
strong civil or military institutions will be equally prone to humanitarian 
atrocities. Regimes in weak states that have successfully consolidated their 
authority by co-opting their political opponents and significant sections of 
civil society may be less prone to humanitarian atrocities than regimes that 
 
 
 117. See Seth A. Malamut, A Band-aid on a Machete Wound: The Failures of the Kimberley 
Process and Diamond-Caused Bloodshed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 29 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 25, 29–30 (2005) (describing role of diamonds and other natural resources in 
civil wars involving Congo). 
 118. See Tracey Michelle Price, The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations, 
and the Universality Debate, 12 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 12 (2003) (describing diamonds as target 
of rebels during Sierra Leone civil war). 
 119. See McGowan, supra note 83, at 341. 
 120. See Foreign Policy & The Fund for Peace, supra note 81, at 50. 
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have failed to do so. For instance, this is likely the case in Côte d’Ivoire 
under the regime of Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Although Côte d’Ivoire was 
always a weak state, Houphouët was able to use a combination of 
extensive patronage networks, a forced one-party system, and a sheer cult 
of personality to create a relatively stable regime that lasted over thirty 
years.121 Upon his death, however, the state’s institutional vulnerabilities 
were exposed, and Côte d’Ivoire quickly descended into a bitter and 
tumultuous civil war.122 Thus, it is possible in weak states for a strong and 
autocratic regime to adopt leadership strategies that make less likely the 
kinds of political crisis that lead to humanitarian atrocities. In Table 4 
below, we classify states into categories according to the risks of their 
being subject to humanitarian atrocities. According to our hypothesis, we 
would expect most humanitarian atrocities to occur in states in the lower 
left quadrant. States in the upper quadrants—most advanced 
democracies—will have very little reason to adopt domestic enforcement 
strategies to counter humanitarian atrocities because the institutional 
conditions that make such atrocities likely will probably be nonexistent. 
TABLE 4 
RISK THAT STATES WILL BE PRONE TO HUMANITARIAN ATROCITIES 
Efforts to Avoid Atrocities 
 Minimal Significantly High 
Degree of 
Atrocities 
Risk 
 
Minimal 
Humanitarian atrocities are 
almost non-existent because 
of strong institutions, 
political transparency, and 
political accountability. 
Example: most 
industrialized western 
democracies. 
No governments should be 
found in this category. 
Given the presence of 
strong institutions, there is 
no need to adopt strategies 
that reduce the kind of 
intense political crisis that 
would lead to atrocities. 
 
 
 121. Howard W. French, Les Faux Complots d’Houphouët-Boigny [The Fake Plots of Houphouët-
Boigny], FOREIGN POL’Y, Spring 1999, 114, 115–19. 
 122.  Id. 
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Significantly 
High 
 
Atrocities are very likely 
because of the lack of 
strong institutions and 
political accountability. 
Moreover, governments are 
not adopting strategies that 
make political crisis 
unlikely. 
Examples: Côte d’Ivoire 
after Houphouët-Boigny, 
Congo (DRC) since 
independence, Liberia 
under Doe and Taylor. 
Atrocities are relatively 
rare. Although states in 
this category lack strong 
institutions, they have 
adopted regime-specific 
strategies like patronage or 
rent-dispensation networks 
that make political crisis 
unlikely. 
Example: Côte d’Ivoire 
under Houphouët-Boigny. 
 
The current deterrence-based justifications for ICTs, however, mostly 
ignore this distinction between the opportunity and the willingness to 
commit atrocities. But if there is no significant difference between the 
willingness factor in mature and weak states, then it makes much more 
sense to focus on incapacitation rather than the type of deterrence 
strategies favored by ICT proponents. At this stage, we have insufficient 
information regarding the relative weight of these factors. But the 
preliminary evidence does suggest that each state’s institutional capacity 
circumscribes the choices available to potential perpetrators of human 
rights atrocities.  
VI. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF ICT PROSECUTIONS 
Even though some academic commentators have expressed 
reservations about the deterrent effect of ICTs, they are usually willing to 
accord to ICTs other positive spillover effects, such as transmitting norms 
of justice, promoting reconciliation between warring groups, and giving 
victims the opportunity to tell their stories.123 We do not contest the 
 
 
 123. For instance, Theodor Meron suggests that the hopes of ICT proponents are not only 
deterrence, but also that “the individualization and decollectivization of guilt . . . would help bring 
about peace and reconciliation.” Theodor Meron, Answering for War Crimes: Lesson from the 
Balkans, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 2, 6 (1997). While acknowledging that the direct deterrence value of ICTs 
is debatable, some proponents of ICTs nonetheless argue that the ICTs’ role in the development of a 
jurisprudence of the laws of war may have a deterrent effect on future perpetrators of atrocities. See 
Allison Danner & Jenny Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command 
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 148 (2005) 
(“There is more hope, however, that the well-established law of war, which is enforced through 
international as well as domestic mechanisms, may, in fact, restrain professional militaries from 
engaging in (or tacitly condoning) large-scale war crimes.”). 
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possibility that ICTs can have beneficial effects other than deterrence, 
although we do believe that no causal relationship between ICT 
prosecutions and these other beneficial effects has been demonstrated. For 
instance, despite the fact that the ICTY has been in existence for over ten 
years, it has yet to win significant acceptance among Serbs who largely 
view it as playing a politically biased role in the Balkan disputes.124  
On the other hand, causal logic and some contrary empirical evidence 
suggest that ICTs may sometimes exacerbate humanitarian atrocities.125 
Indeed, we argue that on balance, ICT prosecutions in the context of 
ongoing military disputes in weak states are likely to be counterproductive 
because any marginal deterrent benefits of such prosecutions are likely to 
be outweighed by their exacerbating effects. We focus on two factors that 
might cause ICTs to deepen cleavages in weak states: the prosecution of 
politically indispensable individuals and political opportunism effects. 
A. The Prosecution of Politically Indispensable Individuals 
In discourse about how to resolve humanitarian atrocities, international 
lawyers and political proponents of ICTs often elevate the primacy of legal 
over political solutions.126 As E.H. Carr once noted, this legalist impulse is 
partly motivated by the belief that by “establish[ing] the rule of law . . . we 
shall transfer our differences from the turbulent political atmosphere of 
self-interest to the purer, serener air of impartial justice.”127 But there are a 
number of reasons to believe that in the context of weak states facing 
intense internal turmoil, prosecuting high-profile figures may actually 
 
 
 124. See Sanja Kutnjak Ivković & John Hagan, The Politics of Punishment and the Siege of 
Sarajevo: Toward a Conflict Theory of Perceived International (In)justice, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
369, 380–88 (2006) (observing declining support for the ICTY by Serbian survey-respondents who 
increasingly believe that international judges on the ICTY are politically biased); Alissa J. Rubin & 
Zoran Cirjakovic, Milosevic’s Death Kindles Old Tensions, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2006, at A11 (“The 
combination of Milosevic’s death, which many Serbs believe was caused by the tribunal, either 
through neglect or murder, and a sense that the tribunal treated Serbs unjustly, will make it more 
difficult for the Serbian government to transfer Mladic to The Hague.”). 
 125. For a brief and more general discussion of the unintended consequences of using 
international courts to enforce compliance, see Karen Alter, Do International Courts Enhance 
Compliance with International Law?, 25 REV. ASIAN & PAC. STUD. 51, 73 (2004); see also Lawrence 
Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth 
Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1832 (2002).  
 126. Norms of international accountability are an offshoot of global liberalism, which, as some 
commentators have pointed out, is evident in the growing legalization of international relations. See 
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 
421 (2001).  
 127. E.H. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS’ CRISIS, 1919–1939: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 170 (1946). 
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deepen a humanitarian crisis by making political settlements more 
difficult. More specifically, to the extent that ICT prosecutions or 
indictments take place before military conflicts in weak states are 
decisively resolved, they are more likely to derail or hinder successful 
peace mediations.  
One key distinction between weak and mature states underscores some 
of the unintended consequences of ICT prosecutions. In stable, well-
established political systems, enforcement agencies can target and 
prosecute politically well-connected individuals with relatively little fear 
of facing reprisals or undermining state institutions. In weak states on the 
brink of collapse, however, viable institutions are often a luxury and well-
connected individual political players tend to become crucial players in 
efforts to consolidate authority and reestablish political stability.128 
Moreover, when weak states are embroiled in massive civil wars, 
belligerents or state actors who are participating in humanitarian atrocities 
are less likely to have an incentive to sue for peace if they know they will 
be subject to subsequent prosecution for their activities. Of course, one 
could argue that such actors might have an incentive to avoid engaging in 
humanitarian atrocities in the first place if they know they are likely to 
face subsequent international prosecution. But such an outcome is unlikely 
for two reasons. First, as discussed earlier, these potential humanitarian 
offenders are already subject to a range of more severe preexisting 
sanctions that they seem to discount significantly. Second, the positive 
payoff of committing humanitarian atrocities might be significant enough 
to a rational offender that he will have very little incentive to factor in the 
remote possibility of an international prosecution.  
In any event, scholars of comparative politics largely agree that 
bargains among political elites—including oppositional belligerents—are 
critical to consolidating democratic transitions and fostering institution 
building in weak states. As Przeworski argues, “If a peaceful transition is 
to be possible, the first problem to be solved is how to institutionalize 
uncertainty without threatening the interests of those who can still reverse 
the process.”129 Throughout Latin America, Europe, and Africa, such elite 
pacts have proven successful in diffusing the resistance of prior 
 
 
 128. See Stephen J. Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, 22 INT’L SEC. 5, 5 (1997) 
(defining spoilers as “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens 
their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it”). 
 129. Adam Przeworski, Some Problems in the Study of Transition to Democracy, in TRANSITIONS 
FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY 60 (Guillermo O’Donnell, Phillipe C. 
Schmitter, & Laurence Whitehead eds., 1986).  
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authoritarian regimes to reform and preventing large-scale political 
upheaval.130 For instance, elite pacts proved crucial in brokering transition 
arrangements in South Africa, Chile, and Argentina.  
In South Africa, the pact expressly included an interim provision that 
allowed the second-place party (the apartheid-era Nationalist Party) to 
nominate the deputy president.131 The pact also set up a program for 
former leaders of the apartheid regime who might have been complicit in 
committing racial atrocities to apply for amnesty.132 To the leaders of the 
African National Congress, the choice to forego prosecutions against the 
former leaders of apartheid was considered critical for a peaceful and 
workable transition. As Thabo Mbeki, then Deputy President of South 
Africa, observed, “Had there been a threat of a Nuremberg-style trial over 
members of the apartheid security establishment we would have never 
undergone peaceful change.”133  
By targeting well-connected political individuals in weak states who 
have allegedly committed atrocities, ICT prosecutions are likely to 
undermine constructive political bargains for peace or even make such 
bargains unlikely in the first place. Indeed, to date, almost all the current 
efforts by the ICC to investigate and prosecute war crimes risk 
destabilizing ongoing peace processes or undermining preexisting political 
bargains that granted amnesties to alleged war criminals. For instance, two 
of the inaugural investigations undertaken by the ICC in Uganda and 
Congo have been met with widespread criticism and condemnation from 
key participants in ongoing peace mediations.  
1. Uganda 
At first blush, the almost twenty-year-old Ugandan civil war looked 
like an ideal test case for the ICC. Since 1986, Joseph Kony and his Lord 
Resistance Army (LRA) had engaged in a quixotic and messianic quest to 
 
 
 130. For a broad discussion of elite pacts during transitions, see Terry Lynn Karl, Dilemmas of 
Democratization in Latin America, 23 COMP. POL. 9 (1990); Alfred Stepan, Paths toward 
Redemocratization: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations, in TRANSITIONS FROM 
AUTHORITARIAN RULE, supra note 129, at 64. 
 131. See Christopher A. Ford, Challenges and Dilemmas of Racial and Ethnic Identity in 
American and Post-Apartheid South African Affirmative Action, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1953, 1960–61 
(1996) (describing provision of the interim constitution which allowed any party receiving more than 
twenty percent of the vote to name a deputy president, enabling F.W. de Klerk to retain an important 
position in the government). 
 132. See Kiss, supra note 41, at 77. 
 133. Alex Boraine, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way, in TRUTH V. 
JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 143.  
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gain control of northern Uganda through a series of well-publicized rapes, 
child abductions, mutilations, and mass murders. Kony, who has claimed 
that he is on a biblical mission from God to take over Uganda, has been 
blamed for the forced abduction of more than 30,000 children. In 1994, 
Betty Bigombe—then a cabinet minister in the Ugandan government—
initiated a peace process with an eye toward bringing both the key LRA 
leaders and the Ugandan government to the table. A vital component of 
the process was a broad-based amnesty program for LRA leaders that the 
Ugandan government had passed into law in 2000.134 By summer 2005, 
over 15,000 former combatants, including thousands of LRA rebels, had 
taken advantage of the amnesty program.135 Although there was some 
significant progress in the negotiations, especially in the late 1990s, 
sporadic fighting between the Ugandan government and the LRA 
continued. In December 2003, Ugandan President Museveni decided to 
refer the LRA case to the newly established ICC; in July 2004, Luis 
Moreno Ocampo—the lead ICC prosecutor—announced he was starting 
his investigation into the conflict. 
Despite some initial praise of the ICC’s investigations by international 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), Bigombe—the lead peace 
negotiator in the conflict—and most of the local groups participating in the 
negotiations in northern Uganda have been unambiguous in condemning 
the ICC for jeopardizing the peace process.136 Of particular concern to 
Bigombe were the warrants that the ICC had been threatening to issue 
since 2004 for the arrest of Kony and four other leaders of the LRA.137 
Just before the warrants were finally issued in the fall of 2005, Bigombe 
had managed to achieve some key breakthroughs in the negotiations and 
had sought to obtain explicit offers of amnesty from the Ugandan 
government for Kony and other key LRA leaders. These amnesty offers 
were no longer options after the ICC issued its warrants. For Bigombe, the 
ICC’s decision to issue the warrants imperiled the chances of any further 
peaceful negotiations with the LRA.  
 
 
 134. See Amnesty Act, 2000 (Uganda), available at http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/northern-
uganda/documents/2000_Jan_The_Amnesty_Act.doc. The Amnesty Act targets “any Ugandan who 
has at any time since the 26th day of January, 1986 engaged in or is engaging in war or armed rebellion 
against the Republic of Uganda.” Id. § 3(1).  
 135. See Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Accountability of Non-State Actors in Uganda for War Crimes and 
Human Rights Violations: Between Amnesty and the International Criminal Court, 10 J. CONFLICT & 
SECURITY L. 405, 421 (2005). 
 136. See Reuters, Uganda Aide Criticizes Court over Warrants, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005, at 
Section 1; see also Bamuturaki Musinguzi, Amnesty Group Rejects ICC Trial of Kony Rebels, THE 
EAST AFRICAN (Nairobi), Feb. 16, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 7085420.  
 137. See Musinguzi, supra note 136. 
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In addition to Bigombe, almost all the important northern Ugandan 
groups involved in the peace process have been critical of the ICC’s role. 
For instance, Bryan Higgs, Ugandan Program Development Officer for 
Conciliation, has argued that the ICC “committed a terrible blunder” by 
initiating a process that promises “in the end [that] neither justice nor 
peace will be delivered.”138 Bishop Ochola, the vice chair of the Acholi 
Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI)—the most prominent NGO 
representing LRA victims—told a journalist, “This kind of approach will 
destroy all efforts for peace . . . If we follow the ICC in branding LRA 
criminals, [this war] won’t stop.”139 Father Rodriguez—another prominent 
leader of the ARLPI—was even more direct in his criticism: “The issuing 
of . . . international arrest warrants would practically close once and for all 
the path to peaceful negotiation as a means to end this long war . . . .”140 
Even key foreign participants in the peace process, such as Bishop Tutu of 
South Africa and Britain’s U.N. Ambassador Emyr Jones Parry, have 
acknowledged that the ICC’s role in Uganda has probably worsened the 
prospects for any peaceful resolution to the nearly twenty-year conflict.141  
The problematic role of the ICC was highlighted by President 
Museveni’s dramatic peace offer to Kony and the LRA in the spring of 
2006. Although Museveni promised a peace deal if Kony and the LRA 
agreed to disarm by July, the ICC initially demanded that the Ugandan 
government turn Kony over to the ICC consistent with its ICC 
commitments.142 This impasse prompted Kony to insist that the ICC drop 
its charges against him and other LRA leaders as a condition for any future 
peace negotiations.143 Indeed, he initially refused to personally attend any 
peace talks, probably due to fear of being arrested. Under persistent 
pressure from the Ugandan government, the ICC apparently agreed to 
rescind the arrest warrants against the LRA leaders.144 Ostensibly, the 
Ugandan government concluded that since the ICC lacked the military or 
 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. See Adam Branch, International Justice, Local Injustice: The International Criminal Court 
in Northern Uganda, DISSENT, Summer 2004, at 22, 24. 
 140. See id.  
 141. See Josephine Volqvartz, ICC Under Fire over Uganda Probe, CNN, Feb. 23, 2005, 
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/2005/0223iccfire.htm. 
 142. See Uganda ‘Must Arrest’ LRA Leader, BBC News, May 18, 2006, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4992896.stm. 
 143. See Frank Nyakairu, Drop Charges Against Me, Kony Tells World Court, THE DAILY 
MONITOR, May 25, 2006, available at http://www.kas.de/proj/home/pub/8412/year-2006/document_ 
id-8503/index.html. 
 144. See Charles Kazooba & Jumah Senyonga, ICC Willing to Lift Kony Indictment, Says 
Uganda, THE NEW TIMES (Kigali), Aug. 4, 2006, available at http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/ 
warcrimeswatch/archives/wcpw_vol01issue13.html. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 777 Ku Nzelibe book pages.doc 8/31/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
822 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:777 
 
 
 
 
enforcement resources to back up its arrest warrants, it was futile for the 
government to rely on an ICC prosecution as a political strategy for 
subduing the LRA. As one high-level Ugandan official bluntly put it: “We 
approached an international peace keeping force to arrest Kony and his 
commanders but they said it was not their concern and did not have the 
mandate. . . . That is why we decided to opt for peace talks with the 
LRA.”145 In any event, the LRA leaders eventually agreed to a unilateral 
ceasefire, presumably with the understanding that they would be granted 
immunity from prosecution.146 Whether or not the ceasefire will 
eventually lead to a comprehensive peace agreement in this longstanding 
conflict remains to be seen.147 Nonetheless, the Ugandan government 
seems to have concluded that the initial decision to seek an ICC referral 
did not increase the government’s chance of a military victory over the 
LRA, but instead made the prospects of a successful peace settlement less 
likely.  
2. Congo 
A similar scenario has played out with the ICC efforts to intervene in 
the civil war in Congo.148 After Laurent Kabila deposed the dictator 
Mobustu Sese-Seko in 1997, Congo descended into a brutal and costly 
civil war in which 3.8 million people died, and in which almost the same 
number of people were displaced from their homes. In January 2001, 
Laurent Kabila was assassinated and replaced by his son Joseph—a thirty-
two-year-old soldier with hardly any political experience. In late 2002, 
South African President Thabo Mbeki managed to broker a peace 
agreement in Pretoria that detailed the terms of a transitional government 
and established a Truth and Reconciliation Committee. Under the terms of 
the agreement, Joseph Kabila would be the president but would share 
authority with four vice presidents from the major rebel groups. Moreover, 
the peace agreement brought an end to the foreign intervention in the 
conflict by Uganda, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Angola. The agreement did 
 
 
 145. See id. 
 146. See Reuters, World Briefing Africa: Uganda: Rebels Declare A Cease-Fire, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 5, 2006, at A2.  
 147. Indeed, most recently, the LRA rebels appear to have walked out of the peace negotiations 
over disagreements about whether the Ugandan government should also declare a ceasefire. See 
Reuters, Uganda: Rebels Pull Out Of Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2006, at A8. 
 148. For a detailed discussion of the ICC’s investigation in the Congolese civil war, see William 
W. Burke-White, Complementarity in Practice: The International Criminal Court as Part of a System 
of Multi-Level Global Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 557 
(2005).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss4/1
p 777 Ku Nzelibe book pages.doc 8/31/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 823 
 
 
 
 
not end all hostilities, however, and in April 2004 Kabila sought a referral 
to the ICC. Although the investigation by the ICC into the Congolese civil 
war has not proceeded as far as in the Ugandan case, there are some 
concerns that the ongoing investigation may undermine the fragile peace 
of the 2002 agreement. In particular, since any subsequent warrants are 
likely to target the rebel leaders who are now members of the coalitional 
government, these leaders may now have very few incentives to keep up 
their end of the bargain.149 Indeed, some observers believe that one of 
Kabila’s motivations for seeking the ICC referral was to neutralize his 
chief political rivals; his rivals happen to be those most likely to be targets 
of any ICC investigation.150 Consequently, the ICC’s current investigation 
risks undermining the fragile peace agreement that has kept the coalitional 
government together. Louis Michel, the foreign minister of Belgium and 
one of the key participants in the peace process, has actually expressed 
concern that the ICC’s investigation could “run[] the risk of causing the 
[peace] process to implode.”151 
3. Sierra Leone and Liberia 
Efforts by other ICTs to prosecute or indict political “spoilers” have 
also provoked backlash or warnings from peace mediators in other 
conflicts. For instance, the Special Court for Sierra Leone—a mixed 
tribunal established by the United Nations and the Sierra Leone 
government—issued an indictment in March 2003 to arrest Charles 
Taylor, the then dictator of Liberia, for his role in humanitarian atrocities 
committed during the Sierra Leone civil war. Instead of being arrested, 
however, Taylor voluntarily resigned in August 2003 and gave himself up 
to Nigerian troops in exchange for amnesty and exile to Nigeria. Despite 
calls by the Special Court for Sierra Leone for Nigeria to surrender Taylor, 
and pressure from the United States, Nigeria pointedly refused to hand 
over Taylor. 
 
 
 149. See id. at 565 (“Kabila is unlikely to be the subject of any ICC investigation, yet two of his 
potential electoral opponents—Vice Presidents Jean Pierre Bemba of the MLC and Azarias Ruberwa 
of the RCD—are among those most likely to be the subject of any early investigation.”). 
 150. See id. (“Kabila’s chief political rivals . . . could well find themselves the targets of 
international investigations, in turn strengthening Kabila’s political hand in the transitional 
government and forthcoming elections.”). 
 151. Pascal Kambale & Anna Rotman, The International Criminal Court and Congo: Examining 
the Possibilities, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, Oct. 2004 (quoting Foreign Minister Louis Michel), 
available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/africa-mag/afr_05_kambale.html. 
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The Nigerian government’s success in pressuring Taylor to resign and 
accept asylum underscores the weakness of international tribunals when 
dealing with contemporary conflicts that involve uneven distributions of 
political power. At the time the Sierra Leone tribunal originally issued its 
indictments, Taylor was the Liberian head of state and still commanded 
substantial allegiance from Liberian government troops and paramilitary 
units throughout the country. If the Nigerian government had not granted 
Taylor asylum, he would have likely remained in power and exacerbated 
the humanitarian crisis in both Liberia and the Sierra Leone. Moreover, 
even if the West African troops could have forced Taylor out of power 
involuntarily, the whole process to remove him could have resulted in 
significantly more casualties as Taylor would have had every incentive to 
fight to the end. By contrast, the special tribunal had no power to enforce 
its arrest warrant against Taylor, nor did any of the tribunal’s sponsors—
the United Nations or Sierra Leone—appear willing or able to apprehend 
him by force. But for the West African governments whose troops bore a 
significant brunt of the casualties in the Liberian civil war, ending the 
conflict peacefully was the primary priority. In this respect, the tribunal’s 
narrow focus on justice against perpetrators of humanitarian atrocities 
seemed misplaced to the West African mediators. When the indictment by 
the tribunal was originally announced, the Organization of West African 
States proclaimed that the special tribunal’s actions had “put a damper on 
the negotiations” at the stage when Taylor seemed most amenable to 
ending the conflict.152 
The Nigerian government eventually agreed to hand Taylor over to the 
newly elected Liberian government; however, it refused to hand Taylor 
over to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. But even after a widely 
acclaimed and peaceful election process in late 2005, the newly elected 
Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf announced that prosecuting 
Taylor was not a priority for her administration and that she had no 
interest in asking Nigeria to end his asylum.153 Like the ICC’s role in the 
Ugandan civil war, the irony of the special tribunal’s quest to prosecute 
Taylor is that two of the groups that were probably most victimized by 
Taylor’s brutal reign—Liberian citizens and West African peacekeepers—
have both expressed an interest in not pursuing justice. Later, under 
pressure from the United States, Johnson-Sirleaf reluctantly agreed to 
 
 
 152. See Virginie Ladisch, Liberian President Indicted for War Crimes, CRIMES OF WAR 
PROJECT, June 16, 2003, available at http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-liberian.html.  
 153. See Taylor ‘Not Priority’ for Liberia, BBC News Service, Jan. 27, 2006, http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/4655186.stm.  
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request Taylor’s surrender. Nigeria complied, but Johnson-Sirleaf’s 
reluctance to prosecute Taylor was so great that Taylor was immediately 
transferred to a helicopter that flew him to the custody of the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone.154  
In yet another interesting twist to this ongoing saga, the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone recently decided that it could no longer afford to try 
Taylor for war crimes because the spectacle of a trial could undermine the 
fragile peace agreement that ended the Sierra Leone civil war.155 The 
Dutch government has since agreed to host Taylor’s formal trial at a 
special ICC courtroom at the Hague, but only if another country commits 
to hosting Taylor’s prison term if he eventually gets convicted.156  
The Liberian experience illustrates that in the wake of transitions from 
harsh non-democratic regimes, the political clout of former political actors 
may constrain the choices of the new government. But that constraint is 
not insurmountable; if the government feels strong and secure enough, it 
may decide to expend its political capital and prosecute members of the 
old guard. In other circumstances, however, the government may wisely 
conclude that arresting and prosecuting spoilers is likely to undermine the 
transition process. Beyond the domestic government’s decision to avoid 
prosecution, outside mediators or intervenors like Nigeria also have to take 
into account the tradeoffs that may exist between peace and justice in the 
transition process. Since the Nigerian government promised to give Taylor 
asylum in exchange for immunity, it was bound—on grounds of political 
prudence—to keep its agreement. Had the Nigerian government violated 
its commitment, it could have diminished the credibility of amnesty offers 
and made it less likely that future perpetrators of atrocities would be 
willing to leave power voluntarily.  
Recently, some commentators have suggested that even when asylum 
is an option the ICC is likely to deter humanitarian offenders. For instance, 
Gilligan has argued that because some dictators might sometimes prefer to 
surrender to the ICC than stay in power, the ICC will lower the value of 
committing atrocities even when asylum is an available alternative.157 The 
problem with this analysis is that it assumes that countries that agree to 
provide asylum to dictators are going to be largely indifferent to the 
 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. See Lydia Polgreen & Marlisse Simons, Sierra Leone Asks to Move Liberian’s Trial, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006, at A7.  
 156. See Marlise Simons, Former Liberian President in The Hague for Trial, N.Y. TIMES, June 
21, 2006, at A6. 
 157. See Gilligan, supra note 5, at 943. 
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existence of indictments. But if the countries that are likely to be safe 
havens for dictators are unable to commit credibly to asylum bargains 
because of international pressure, the ICC will tend to weaken the value of 
asylum bargains in the first place. 
In sum, the notion that seeking justice through international tribunals 
facilitates peace-building in weak states is often misguided. As a post-
conflict reconstruction tactic, prosecutions by international tribunals may 
actually create stumbling blocks for more politically realistic alternatives 
to address past grievances, including amnesty, exile, or lustration.158  
Of course, we are not suggesting that ICT investigations will always 
jeopardize efforts to seek a peaceful resolution to an ongoing humanitarian 
crisis. For instance, in circumstances where peace has been forcibly 
imposed on the belligerents and the ICT investigations enjoy substantial 
local support, investigations may prove to be a salutary mechanism for 
holding the worst humanitarian offenders accountable. Indeed, one of the 
circumstances that made the Nuremberg trials a practical option after the 
end of World War II was the existence of a clear military victory and the 
commitment by the Allied forces to occupy Germany until peace was 
established. But these preconditions do not necessarily exist elsewhere, 
especially among weak states where the extent of military victories is 
usually ambiguous and the commitment by occupying powers to stay the 
course is generally weak. In other words, if a government in a weak state 
simply lacks the capacity to subdue a belligerent by force, then threatening 
the belligerent with an international criminal prosecution—as the ICC is 
currently doing in the Ugandan civil war—is likely to be misguided and 
counterproductive. After all, if the Ugandan army could apprehend or kill 
the leaders of the LRA on its own, it would have every incentive to do so 
even without the intervention of the ICC. As Snyder and Vinjamuri have 
suggested elsewhere, “[a]ttempting to implement universal standards of 
criminal justice in the absence of . . . political and institutional 
preconditions risks weakening norms of justice by revealing their 
ineffectiveness and hindering necessary political bargaining.”159 
 
 
 158. Lustration is a sanction that involves banning perpetrators from holding public office. See 
Michael P. Sharf, From the Exile Files: An Essay on Trading Justice for Peace, 63 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 339, 346 (2006) . 
 159. See Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trial and Error: Principle and Pragmatism in 
Strategies of International Justice, 28 INT’L SECURITY 5, 6 (2004); see also Tonya Putnam, Human 
Rights and Sustainable Peace, in ENDING CIVIL WARS: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACE 
AGREEMENTS 237 (Stephen John Stedman et al. eds., 2002) (“The heart of the problem is the apparent 
failure of many international human rights organizations . . . to recognize that effective promotion and 
protection of human rights in postconflict settings requires different tactics than those typically applied 
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B. Political Opportunism Effects 
Proponents of ICTs often argue that ICT prosecutions will spur 
beneficial institutional reform in weak states.160 In this section, we suggest 
that the opposite is more likely true: ICT prosecutions will often cause 
politicians in weak states to under-invest in the kinds of institutional 
reforms necessary to avoid humanitarian atrocities in the first place. If 
local politicians believe that they can use ICT investigations to demonize 
political opponents or use them to scapegoat others for their own failures 
to deal effectively with humanitarian abuses in their communities, they 
may elect to turn a blind eye to the hard political decisions that will reduce 
the risks that a budding civil war will escalate into a humanitarian crisis. 
Thus, an ICT regime that is designed to insure against humanitarian 
atrocities may inadvertently promote the kind of imprudent risk-taking 
behavior that worsens such atrocities.  
Various commentators have recently observed that political regimes in 
weak states will often embrace the rhetoric of international justice norms 
for narrow political objectives that have very little to do with promoting 
justice and meaningful institutional reform.161 Furthermore, the notion that 
politicians exploit external assistance efforts to avoid making hard but 
necessary institutional reform choices is a common theme in the literature 
on African political economy. For instance, Uvin has shown how the 
increase in foreign assistance after the Rwandan genocide allowed the 
ruling regime to continue to sidestep critical reform measures and 
disregard the interests of its citizens.162 De Waal has also shown that 
distributions from famine relief in East Africa were often used 
strategically by politicians to shield poor governance and weather political 
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resistance from disaffected groups.163 Analogously, commentators have 
examined how the prospect of International Monetary Fund (IMF) bail-out 
efforts often encourages politicians to ignore structural adjustment 
commitments and engage in shortsighted fiscal policies in order to sustain 
short-term political gains.164 Finally, and more importantly, Reno has 
documented how the Ugandan government has exploited creditor anxieties 
about growing disorder in weak states to suspend necessary institutional 
reform.165 
Of course, if ICTs were able to intervene and provide corrective justice 
in every instance where an otherwise viable domestic alternative might 
have been an option, this political opportunism dynamic might not 
influence the level of humanitarian crimes. In practice, however, the 
decisions by ICTs to investigate atrocities are subject to a whole range of 
political and resource-related constraints. First, since the ICTs lack any 
enforcement powers of their own, they must rely on member states to 
apprehend suspects.166 But as Goldsmith observes, “Nations do not lightly 
expend national blood and treasure to stop human rights abusers in other 
nations.”167 Indeed, the failure of the international community to provide 
the ICC with any military or police support to capture Kony after he was 
indicted for his role in the Ugandan crisis reflects the inability of ICTs to 
pick up the slack for dysfunctional institutions in weak states. Second, 
given that politicians in weak states will often have an incentive to use 
ICT referrals strategically to delegitimize political opponents, nothing 
insures that any ICT referral will generate positive spillover effects for 
domestic institutions.  
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ability to prosecute without the assistance of national authorities). Indeed, even proponents of 
international courts have argued that centralization of authority in international courts, including the 
possession of independent enforcement powers, is not only politically infeasible, but also normatively 
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56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 434 (2003).  
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Simply put, ICTs will often enable politicians in weak states to escape 
accountability and avoid making hard policy decisions in the context of a 
crisis—exactly the opposite of what would be socially optimal for 
domestic institutional reform. In the context of African humanitarian 
crises or civil wars, this perverse dynamic also depends on the fact that 
African governments may often have an incentive to encourage corrupt 
and unprofessional military behavior. For instance, it probably should 
come as no surprise that the Ugandan government has fared so terribly 
against a poorly organized adversary that is led by a high-school dropout 
and former altar boy who claims to be “possessed by spirits, including a 
Sudanese, Chinese, American, and a former minister of Ida Amin.”168 
Indeed, much of the carnage in the Ugandan civil war can be traced largely 
to the pervasive corruption and disorganization of the Ugandan military.169 
As one NGO group involved in the conflict has observed, “the Ugandan 
military has failed to protect civilian populations not only from the LRA 
but also from its own troops, who have come in some cases to be the 
major source of insecurity . . . .”170 But the Ugandan military’s disabilities 
are not obviously accidental; there is now a general consensus that the 
Ugandan army’s forays into the Congolese civil war in the late 1990s were 
motivated by President Museveni’s desire to extract mineral resources and 
defend diamond and gold mines that his generals operated for personal 
gain.171 In other instances, the plundered goods from Congo were used to 
supplement Ugandan state coffers; financial data from the Ugandan 
government show that Ugandan gold exports rose from less than $13 
million in 1994-1995 to $110 million in 1996-1997.172  
The incentive for insecure African regimes to corrupt their militaries by 
outsourcing revenue collection underscores the perverse logic of initiating 
ICT prosecutions amidst ongoing military disputes. According to this 
logic, Ugandan President Museveni’s decision to seek an ICC referral in 
2003 might be no more than a poorly disguised attempt to cloak his 
foundering military campaign against the LRA with international 
legitimacy. Indeed, Article 17 of the Rome Statue provides that the ICC 
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 169. See Ssenyonjo, supra note 135, at 431–32 (observing that according to the Ugandan 
government one of the main reasons for the persistence of the conflict with the LRA is the corruption 
and drunkenness of Ugandan soldiers).  
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Jan. 17, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 924222. 
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will step in only where the domestic legal system involved is unwilling or 
unable to prosecute.173 But Uganda’s institutional problems in prosecuting 
LRA leaders have more to do with its military than its courts; there is very 
little evidence that the Ugandan courts would be institutionally incapable 
of prosecuting Kony if he were captured. Thus, a more plausible 
explanation for the Ugandan referral to the ICC is that Museveni hopes 
that the ICC’s warrants against the LRA leaders will renew international 
support for his regime and increase the chance of an outright military 
victory over the LRA. Moreover, given the contemporary political 
problems he is facing, including his widely condemned but successful 
effort to win a third term in office,174 Museveni likely believes that any 
effort to seek a peaceful compromise with the LRA will jeopardize his 
political future. But why, one might ask, should the ICC provide Museveni 
with an opportunity to free ride on the coattails of an international legal 
regime that is ostensibly designed to encourage governmental 
accountability? 
Beyond the Ugandan experience, there is ample evidence that regimes 
in weak states welcome ICT prosecutions only when those prosecutions 
support the regime’s narrow political prerogatives. Often, these 
prerogatives are at odds with the holistic diffusion of international norms 
of justice purportedly embraced by ICTs. In Rwanda, the ruling Tutsi 
regime has selectively embraced the ICTR’s prosecution of its Hutu 
political opponents but has balked at cooperating with the tribunal’s 
efforts to investigate and prosecute Tutsi individuals.175 In Congo, almost 
every likely target of the ICC’s investigation turned out to be one of 
Kabila’s powerful political opponents.176 In Yugoslavia, the Croatian 
government actively supported the ICTY’s efforts to investigate and 
prosecute Serbians accused of war crimes, but promptly suspended its 
support once the first Croatians were indicted.177 Thus, in case after case, 
regimes in weak states seem to be reluctant to support ICT investigations 
when regime supporters are likely targets. Conversely, these same regimes 
 
 
 173. Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 17. 
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continue unless the government changes its policy of silencing opposition voices and avoids focusing 
on amending the Ugandan constitution in order to entrench Museveni in power for a third term).  
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 176. Burke-White, supra note 148, at 565. 
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seem eager to embrace ICT investigations when the likely targets are their 
political opponents. Therefore, to the extent that ICT investigations are 
used selectively to vindicate the political objectives of the ruling regime, 
such investigations will likely undermine rather than promote the dual 
goals of promoting transitional justice and facilitating institutional reform.  
Ultimately, it seems reasonable to conclude that the primary obligation 
to prevent humanitarian atrocities rests with the state in which the 
atrocities take place, and by extension, its rulers. If a regime decides to 
trade corrective institutional reform for corrupt rent-seeking opportunities, 
however, it is not clear why the ICC should intervene and provide political 
cover to that regime when a crisis unfolds. To outside observers, having 
the ICC help the leaders of Uganda and Congo consolidate their authority 
by hunting down alleged war criminals may seem like a small price to pay 
for achieving international justice. But the victims of these conflicts likely 
have very different visions of the relationship between the ICC and their 
governments. Perhaps that is why most of the representatives of the LRA 
victims in northern Uganda, as well as the mediators in that conflict, have 
accused the ICC of turning a blind eye to their concerns in that region’s 
crisis.178  
VII. CONCLUSION 
We live in a golden age of international criminal tribunals. Between the 
creation of the permanent International Criminal Court and the continued 
reliance on ad hoc ICTs created by the U.N. Security Council, the world 
has never before witnessed the frequency of independent international 
criminal prosecutions that is occurring today. Nonetheless, the empirical 
and theoretical assumptions that underpin the deterrence rationale for these 
ICTs remain dubious or highly debatable. Supporters of ICTs generally 
assume that a pervasive “culture of impunity” exists in certain states and 
that by ending such a culture, ICT prosecutions will eventually deter 
future atrocities.  
This Article challenges this “culture of impunity” thesis as well as the 
assumption that ICTs deter future humanitarian atrocities. We apply an 
economic model of deterrence to analyze the incentives facing likely 
targets of ICT prosecutions—coup participants involved in civil conflicts 
within weak states. Such a data set is particularly relevant because for both 
legal and political reasons ICT prosecutions will almost exclusively target 
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those committing atrocities in conflicts occurring within weak or failed 
states.  
Our model and data suggest that any deterrence effect of ICT 
prosecutions, whether ad hoc or via the permanent ICC, is likely to be 
marginal given the existence of a range of preexisting sanctions in weak 
states. Potential ICT targets, who are the only individuals likely to be 
deterred by the threat of an ICT prosecution, already face a substantial 
likelihood of informal sanctions (such as death, imprisonment, and torture) 
of greater severity and certainty than any sanction likely to be meted out 
by an ICT. Given the very low likelihood of actually facing an ICT 
prosecution, and the significant constraints ICTs face in administering 
sanctions, we believe ICT prosecutions will be unlikely to have any 
meaningful deterrence effect.  
Furthermore, we suggest that the high incidence of humanitarian 
atrocities in weak states might have more to do with the offenders’ 
opportunities to commit atrocities rather than their willingness to do so. 
These opportunities typically arise in weak or failed states because such 
states usually lack the institutional ability to incapacitate potential 
humanitarian offenders. In other words, developing an effective 
framework for addressing humanitarian atrocities might have less to do 
with initiating international prosecutions, and more to do with building 
robust domestic institutions in weak states that can successfully channel 
political participation and dispute resolution.  
We also suggest that ICT prosecutions might not only fail to deter 
humanitarian offenders, but might actually exacerbate atrocities. First, ICT 
prosecutions that are initiated outside of a state’s domestic processes 
might demand the removal and arrest of politically indispensable figures 
prior to the resolution of a civil conflict. As a number of current conflicts 
in Africa already demonstrate, even initiating an international prosecution 
might fatally undermine the prospects of peace negotiations. Second, the 
growing ICT institutional framework might distort the incentives of 
leaders in weak states to engage in the kinds of constructive reform efforts 
that will thwart future humanitarian atrocities. In other words, rather than 
invest in building domestic institutions that can incapacitate domestic 
offenders, leaders of such states will often seek to use the threat of an ICT 
prosecution to achieve narrow political objectives that will often be 
inconsistent with the norm-promotion goals of ICTs.  
Of course, our analysis should be treated with some caution because 
there have been too few ICT prosecutions to perform the kinds of 
econometric tests that would generate systematic empirical results. But 
even if it seems early to make concrete empirical generalizations about the 
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effects of ICT prosecutions, we might still be able to make plausible 
inferences about the likelihood of deterrence given the availability of 
alternative sanctions. In essence, although the empirical evidence 
presented here is largely exploratory and descriptive, it suggests reasons to 
be wary of the deterrence promise of ICTs. Should the international 
community completely abandon ICTs in favor of purely political or local 
approaches to combating humanitarian atrocities? We do not presume to 
answer that question. What we do know is that it is dangerously naïve to 
ignore the possibility that ICTs might not only lack any significant 
deterrence benefits, but might actually exacerbate conflicts in weak states. 
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